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The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis
Standard of Equal Protection
William D. Araiza'
This Article addresses the currentcontroversy over the scope of Congress&power to
enforce the EqualProtection Clause. Recent Section 5 cases have engenderedmuch citicism,
some of it focused at the Supreme Court seeming disrespect for Congress's fact-finding
capabilities, some of it on the "congruence and proporonality" standard the Court has
enunciated and the most aggressive of it arguing that Congressshould have a greaterrole in
determining consdtutionalmeaning
Tis Article takes a differnt tack. It focuses not on what power Congressshould have
vis--vis the Court but rather,on what the Courthas actually saidabout equalprotection. It
argues that many equal protection decisions do not represent abstract statements of equal
protection law,instead they rellect the outcome ofdecisionalmethods thatspeak to underlying
constitutionalconcerns but which don't themselves ield statements about what the Equal
Protection Clausemeans. Thus, less equalprotection "law" exists an is commonly assumed
In turn,more room exists for Section 5legislation.
The Article focuses on the rational basis standard It argues that the rarty ofjudicial
strike downs under thatstadarddoesnot mean thatalmostall classilcaftonsso reviewed satisfy
the Equal Protection Clause. Instea4 it suggests that that standardis better understood as a
statement by the court that it often doesn'thave the capabilityconfidently to identify violations
of the Clauses underlyingrule againstunreasonableclassifications. The implication under the
latter view is that the decision upholding the law does not itself amount to a declaration of
constitutionallaw, which Congress is therefore obliged to respect when the latter seeks to
enforce the Clause.
The Aricle arguesthatthe Court own explanationsandapplicationsof the rationalbasis
standardsupport thisjudicial-resaintcharacterization. It then argues that the reasons for that
restraintapply with much less force to Congress,given the latters institutionalcharactrstics.
The Article then applies these insights to the Courtt explanation, in City of Cleburne v.
*
Professor of Law and Richard A. Vachon Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. This Article greatly benefited from the input of participants at faculty workshops at
the University of San Diego School of Law and Pepperdine University School of Law; the
author is grateful for those opportunities. The author also wishes to thank Benjamin Lin for
fine research assistance.
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Cleburne Living Center, of why it would not grantsuspectcass status to the mentally retarded
Cleburne sexplanation allows a comparison ofCongress s and the Court' abilities to determine
whether a classificationruns a highnIskof beingconstitutionallyunreasonable.
The Article then confronts a final theoreticalproblem: If most rationalbasis cases don't
reflect true declarations of equal protection law, and if rational basis cases comprise the vast
majoriy of equalprotection claims,then where is the law in the Equal ProtectionClause? The
Artcle suggests that lurking in the rational basis cases is a fundamental principle of equal
protection law--e nule againstanimus. The last major part of the Article considers if,
and
how,this antianunusrule couldcabin would otherwiseseem to be a very broadSection 5power
The Article concludes by speculating about what this analysis means for Section 5
enactments addressinggenderandrace.Inparticula, the Court~sgenderjurzsprudenceimplies a
significant role for congressionalinput via the Section 5 power The Article also speculates
whether this analysis illuminates the scope of Congresss power to address substantive rights
under the Due ProcessClauseorother clausesofthe FourteenthAmendment.
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The issue of the scope of the United States Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution'
has occupied courts and commentators for a generation. Nearly forty
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
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years ago, the seminal cases of South Carolina v Katzenbach 2 and
Katzenbach v Morgad granted Congress broad authority to enforce
the Reconstruction Amendments," thereby provoking both sharp
dissents and voluminous academic evaluation and speculation. More
recently, since 1997, the United States Supreme Court has made
cutbacks on Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,6 an important part of its states-rights agenda, striking
down parts of four statutes as exceeding Section 5's grant of authority
to Congress.'
Since South Carolina and Morgan, the Court has experimented
with a variety of approaches to the judicially enforced scope of the
Equal Protection Clause, a basic component of the Reconstruction
Amendments. At the start of this period, the Court subjected almost all
statutes facing an equal protection challenge to the same toothless
"rational basis" standard.8 The only exceptions were statutes that
classified on the basis of race9 and those that provided for unequal
2.
383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
3.
384 U.S. 641,648 (1966).
4.
South Carolinawas in fact a case interpreting the scope of Congress's power to
interpret the Fifteenth Amendment, which has an identically worded congressionalenforcement provision. 383 U.S. at 308. This Article argues for an approach to
congressional-enforcement power that turns on the unique characteristics of the particular
constitutional right being furthered. Thus, technically, this analysis does not automatically
apply to the Fifteenth Amendment's enforcement provision. However, at the time South
Carolinaand Morgan were decided, it was assumed that the enforcement powers in the two
Amendments were of equal scope. The Thirteenth Amendment, because it proscribes private
as well as government action, presents its own complexities with regard to congressional
enforcement, and will not be discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (considering legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's power
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment).
5.
See, e.g., Morgan, 384 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5.
7.
See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (striking down part of the
Americans with Disabilities Act as inappropriate Section 5 legislation); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (reaching the same conclusion with regard to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (striking down the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)
(striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). But see Tennessee v. Lane, 158 L.
Ed. 2d 820, 835 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003)
(upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act as appropriate Section 5 legislation).
8.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (holding that the Kansas
Legislature was free to decide whether legislation was needed to deal with debt adjustment
and that such legislation did not violate due process, nor did it deny equal protection to
nonlawyers).
9.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
McDonaldalso suggested that wealth was a suspect classification, but the Warren Court's
move in that direction never matured into a hard rule and was rejected in the first Term of the
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distribution of fundamental rights," which were subjected to a much
higher level of scrutiny that, as a practical matter, nearly always
resulted in the statute being struck down.
This straightforward approach to equal protection soon gave way.
In the 1970s, the Court experimented with higher levels of scrutiny for
gender, illegitimacy, and alienage classifications, before settling on an
amorphous intermediate status for the first two and strict scrutiny for
some of the third." During the 1980s, the Court became less tolerant
of gender classifications, and in 1996, it ratcheted gender to nearly
full-blown suspect class status." Even then, though, it cautioned that it
would still accept gender classifications justified as compensatory or
reflecting real gender differences, and it fulfilled that prediction
several years later.'3 The 1980s also witnessed a slow, uneven march
toward expanding the strict scrutiny accorded to race-based
decisionmaking defended as compensatory or otherwise benign. As
with gender, that march seemed to have reached its logical endpoint in
the 1990s, when the Court subjected affirmative action contracting setasides to strict scrutiny.'4 However, the Court soon revealed that its
attitude about race, like its attitude toward gender, reflects significant
sensitivity to context. Most notably, in 2003, the Court accorded to the
University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions
policy a scrutiny that was clearly less strict than that accorded the
contracting programs reviewed in previous years.
Perhaps most interestingly, the early- to mid-1980s witnessed a
spate of cases in which the Court experimented with the rational basis
standard. During this period, the Court used a more muscular version
of that standard to strike down classifications based on mental

Burger Court. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (finding no justification
for employing heightened scrutiny to classification based on wealth).
10.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964) (applying heightened
scrutiny to a law resulting in unequal distribution of voting rights).
11.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (summarizing previous illegitimacy cases
as enunciating an intermediate scrutiny standard); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98
(1976) (employing intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (employing rational basis scrutiny for federal law alienage classifications);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (providing for strict scrutiny for state law
alienage classifications).
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996).
12.
13.
See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (upholding gender classification
based on a perceived real difference between the status of motherhood and fatherhood).
14.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)
15.
Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003).
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retardation,' 6 status as an illegal alien minor,'7 and duration of state
residence.' 8 Since then, the Court has continued on occasion to
employ a more muscular rational basis review to strike down laws on
equal protection grounds.'9
As this brief tour makes clear, the Court has departed
significantly from the standard understanding of all three levels of
review that comprise the formal structure of equal protection law, in
favor of a more contextual approach. These cases, especially the
"rational basis plus" cases from the 1980s, coincided with a
fundamental questioning of the three-tiered structure and the political
process theory that underlay it.2" Recent cases in which the Court's
result could not be easily tied to the ostensible scrutiny standard
employed2' have made that fundamental questioning even more
relevant.
The combination of the Court's new limitations on the Section 5
power and the blurring of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
makes it an appropriate time to rethink the relationship between
Congress, the Court, and the Equal Protection Clause. An obvious
response to a Court that seems unenthusiastic about a rigid doctrinal
structure, and more interested in contextual answers to equal protection
questions, is to accord increased respect to legislative input. If context
matters, the argument goes, then Congress, as the federal branch most
attuned to shifting or nuanced social reality, should play a larger role in
equal protection decisionmaking.
Yet congressional action is impeded by the very text that it could
potentially rejuvenate. The fact that Congress's power is limited to
"enforcing" the Equal Protection Clause means that that power is
necessarily tied to the meaning of that provision. By itself this
requirement is unremarkable: all it means is that when Congress seeks
16. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
17. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-25 (1982).
18. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622-23 (1985); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 (1982).
19. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107-09 (2000) (finding an equal protection
violation in different counting methods used by state vote-tabulation boards counting votes
for the same election); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (finding an equal
protection violation in a state constitutional provision denying any protected status based on
sexual orientation); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (finding equal protection to be violated by a state law criminalizing same-sex,
but not opposite-sex, sodomy, as lacking a rational basis).
20. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
744-46 (1985); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
ConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1079-80 (1980).
21.
See cases cited supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, its action must have some link
to the meaning of equal protection. But because the Fourteenth
Amendment also includes a judicially enforceable component,
questions about the acceptable range of congressional action inevitably
require consideration of how the courts have understood that
guarantee. In turn, if the meaning of the Amendment is thought to
depend solely and completely on what the Court says the Clause
means-in other words, if we adopt a juricentric model-then lack of
clarity in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence necessarily infects,
and thus impedes, congressional attempts to breathe new life into it.
Scholars, most notably Robert Post and Reva Siegel, have argued
for a robust congressional role in defining the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
Their argument focuses largely on the
struggle for control over the Constitution's meaning; in particular, it
critiques the judicial supremacy claim they find implicit in the Court's
recent Section 5 jurisprudence. But such arguments should be attuned
to the particular Fourteenth Amendment provision at issue. This
Article focuses on the Equal Protection Clause. It argues that the
Supreme Court itself has often refrained from explicit pretensions to
judicial omniscience in equal protection cases. It therefore suggests
that much of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence does not
authoritatively announce constitutional norms. The Article builds on
that conclusion to suggest that the relative paucity of judicially
announced equal protection "law" opens the way for Congress to be
more creative in applying the few equal protection norms that the
Court has in fact announced.
This Article argues for broader congressional power to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause, within the framework of ultimate judicial
supremacy over the Constitution's meaning, using as an illustration the
Court's explanation and application of the rational basis standard. It
argues that the Court's use of that standard is best understood as a
prudential response to its inability to declare with confidence whether
a statute conforms to equal protection's requirements, rather than as a
statement that the challenged statute is probably constitutional in some
abstract sense. If one accepts this characterization of what the Court is
22. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalismand Section
Five Power: Policentnc Interpretationof the Family andMedical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J.
1943, 1947 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protectingthe Constitution from the
People: Juncentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2003); Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: FederalAntidisctimination Legislation
AfterMorrison andKimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,444 (2000).
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doing when it applies rational basis scrutiny, it follows that neither a
court's decision to apply that standard, nor its upholding of a statute
against it, constitutes "law" that binds Congress in its use of its Section
5 power. 23 Rather, the Section 5 power is more properly cabined by a

proper consideration of both what the Court has actually determined
about the relevant equal protection right and what institutional
advantages make Congress better suited to apply whatever legal rule
the Court has in fact provided.
This argument assumes that Congress is indeed limited to
"enforcing" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
"enforcing" those provisions precludes a role for Congress in secondguessing authoritative Supreme Court statements of the Fourteenth
Amendment's meaning. This assumption reflects the reality of current
law. In City of Boerne v Flores,the leading case in the Court's new
Section 5 jurisprudence, the Court embraced this judicial interpretive
supremacy principle,2" from which no Justice explicitly dissented,25 and
which was joined by two of the four Justices who have voted in favor
of congressional authority in every subsequent Section 5 case.26
Whatever its merits, the judicial superiority principle appears firmly
entrenched in the doctrine. Where this Article diverges from current
doctrine is in its suggestion that the Court's resolution of an equal
protection claim does not necessarily produce an authoritative
statement of the Clause's meaning, warranting status as superior
judicially announced law. The case law supports this more modest
understanding of the Court's jurisprudence, which thus makes this
approach a more promising vehicle for carving out a broader Section 5
power.
The general point that courts do not speak authoritatively on
every constitutional issue has been made before, most notably in
Professor Sager's now classic article on underenforced constitutional

23. A decision to strike a law down, by contrast, may well constitute an equal
protection "law." See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
24. 521 U.S. 507, 516-21 (1997).
25. Justice O'Connor dissented on the underlying substantive question of whether the
federal statute did in fact conflict with the properly understood constitutional rule, but
explicitly agreed otherwise with the Court's congruence and proportionality discussion. See
id at 546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter dissented on the underlying issue without
expressing a view on the Section 5 question, see id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting), as did
Justice Breyer, see id at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26. In particular, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg either joined the majority's opinion in
Boeme or explicitly agreed with its statement on this point.
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norms. What is new since that article, though, is the rise of the less
rigid, more contextualized approach to equal protection sketched
above.28 That approach, and especially its application in the "rational
basis plus" cases, illustrates the Court's estimation of the limits of
judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause. In particular, the
Court's discussion of the rational basis standard in such cases indicates
that that standard flows more from the institutional limits on judicial
review of legislative classifications, and less from the likelihood that a
given classification is constitutional in the abstract sense. At the same
time, the Court's application of more muscular rational basis review
involves it in contextualized decisionmaking that, exactly because it is
more sensitive to the underlying context, is less reflective of legal
principles and more reflective of particularistic applications of
principle to fact. The more contextualized the issues become, however,
the stronger the argument is that Congress should have a say in the
matter, given its superior capacity to distinguish reasonable differential
treatment of a group from exclusion or animus targeted at that same
group.
This Article is one component of a broader project that seeks to
delineate the proper scope of Congress's power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause by examining the Court's own statements about the
Clause's meaning. Those statements include the three-tiered scrutiny
structure that still ostensibly answers all equal protection issues, the
state action requirement, the expansion of the Clause's scope to include
more than discrimination aimed particularly at African-Americans or
even based generally on race, and the privileging of certain rights as
especially requiring equal state distribution (the so-called "fundamental rights prong" of the Clause). In order to determine how those
statements relate to congressional-enforcement power, it is important
to understand their status as equal protection "law" or mere decisional
devices. This Article begins that process by examining the three-tiered
scrutiny structure, in particular, the rational basis standard and that
standard's implications for congressional-enforcement power.
Part I of the Article begins this task by laying out and defending
the proposition that the rational basis standard is in fact merely a
decisional device, grounded in the institutional limitations of judicial
review. It examines the Equal Protection Clause, in particular the rule
against unreasonable or arbitrary classifications, and considers what
27.
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure. The Legal Status of Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1263 (1978).
28.
See cases cited supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
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the Court has said about the role of legislatures (both state and federal)
in determining the reasonableness of classifications. It argues that the
Court itself has conceded its incompetence in many-though,
importantly, not all-situations to determine whether a legislative
classification is reasonable. In particular, Part I argues that the Court's
explanation for granting only rational basis review to most
classifications amounts to just such a concession.
Part II presents the case that Congress is better institutionally
suited than the courts to consider the reasonableness of most legislative
classifications.29 Some of these features are obviously relevant to the
Section 5 issue-for example, Congress's superiority at finding facts.
Others are not so obviously relevant-for example, Congress's
capacity for acting by fiat, rather than as the result of a process of selfconscious legal reasoning. For our purposes, the important point is
that these factors operate with special force when the issue is
enforcement of the equal protection guarantee.
Part II then considers City of Clebume v Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.," probably the best-known of the "rational basis plus"
cases from the 1980s, and in particular the majority's explanation for
not granting suspect class status to the mentally retarded.' While the
Court struck down the government action in Cleburne, it purported to
do so based on the rational basis standard, after rejecting suspect class
status for the mentally retarded."
This combination-rare and
intriguing, and thus the source of much academic commentaryprovides a rare window into the Court's reasoning when confronted
with a statute that is suspicious enough to warrant an eventual strike
down, but nevertheless aimed at a group that the Court does not
consider deserving of official, across-the-board judicial solicitude.
Examination of the Court's suspect class analysis in Cleburne
highlights the institutional concerns identified in Part Il.A and
suggests how congressional action may be better able to combat
whatever equal protection flaw resides in treatment of that group.
After briefly considering institutional differences between state
legislatures and Congress,33 Part I concludes by considering limits on
this competence-based conception of the Section 5 power. First, it
explains how this institutional competence argument fits within the
29.
30.

See inf Part II.A.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).

31.

See infr Part ll.B.

32.

See Cleburne,473 U.S. at 441-43.

33.

See infra Part I.C.
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formal requirement-assumed by this Article-that congressional
action "enforcing" the Equal Protection Clause be distinguished from
congressional attempts to "interpret" it. 4 If that argument can be
understood as responding to the separation of powers concerns raised
by this argument, then Part I.E explains how this conception similarly
respects federalism, by providing a principled, if admittedly imprecise,
limit on Congress's superintending power over states."
Part III speculates on the applicability of this analysis beyond
situations where judicial review is performed under the rational basis
standard. In particular, it briefly examines the judicially declared law
applicable to gender and race classifications and considers how much
room that law leaves for congressional action under Section 5. These
thoughts are preliminary, and are designed more to prompt further
study and thought. Part IV concludes by briefly considering the
applicability of this analysis beyond equal protection, to the
substantive rights guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.

THE NATURE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE

A.

The Dilemma ofEqualProtection,the Court Answer, andthe
Implicationsof ThatAnswer

Equal protection is unique among constitutional rights, both for
its ubiquity and its lack of an easily identifiable, substantive core.
Other constitutional prohibitions apply to discrete types of government
acts, even if difficult analysis is required in order to decide whether
those prohibitions have been violated. Equal protection violations,
though, can be claimed any time government treats two individuals
differently, a situation that results from almost any government action,
from placing citizens in internment camps because of their ethnicity 6
to refusing to supply municipal services as retaliation for a squabble."
In addition to their ubiquity, equal protection claims are marked
by a lack of a substantive standard by which they can be evaluated.
Most constitutional claims can be judged by standards derivable from
sources we might be comfortable describing as "legal." Such sources
include, for example, the common law meaning of terms or practices,
the Drafters' intent, and the implications of a particular provision for
the form of government established in the Constitution. Thus, a Fourth
34.
35.
36.
37.

See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.E.
SeeKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234-35 (1944).
SeeVill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000).
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Amendment claim might be judged against what the Framers, with
their common law understandings, would have considered a "search,""
an Eleventh Amendment argument might be made based on the
Drafters' understanding of the federal system they believed they were
reinforcing," and a speech restriction might be analyzed against the
content-neutrality rule, which itself derives from an understanding of
what self-government requires."° Equal protection claims, however,
require a court simply to determine the reasonableness of the
challenged classification. Except in some very limited cases in which
the Clause's drafting history provides assistance in making that
determination," the reasonableness of a classification must be
determined using sources that, in a significant way, are not "legal" in
origin, and thus not susceptible to authoritative judicial pronouncements.
Consider a well-known case: is it reasonable for a legislature to
prohibit owners of panel trucks from displaying other businesses'
advertising, while allowing them to display their own?" In one sense,
the two groups are clearly alike: truck owners who place advertising
on the sides of their trucks. In another sense, they are different, given
the distinct sources of the advertising. There is no objective natural
difference or similarity between these, or any, groups,"3 and thus no
38. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (considering whether
a "search" has occurred based on the privacy expectations the Framers might have had, based
on common law protections).
39. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (justifying its view of
the scope of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity based on the understanding of the
original Drafters of the Constitution).
40. For the classic statement of the self-government rationale for speech protection,
see W tney v California,274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
41.
For example, a rule against invidious race classifications might be derived from
the intent of the Drafters and the overall historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even here, though, the Drafters' intent and historical context might not furnish support for a
full prohibition on such classifications, because it seems at least arguable that the Drafters
were concerned about equality with regard to only certain classes of rights, not including
social equality and voting. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 200 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that the historical evidence indicates
that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not address discrimination in voter
qualifications).
42. SeeRy. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
43. As Professor Tribe argued more than twenty years ago when critiquing processbased constitutional theories: "One cannot speak of 'groups' as though society were
objectively subdivided along lines that are just there to be discerned. Instead, people draw
lines, attribute differences, as a way of ordering social existence... " Tribe, supranote 20, at
1074 (emphasis in original). As a result, judgments about the appropriateness or reasonableness of a classification are fundamentally value choices: "the conclusion that a legislative
classification reveals prejudicial stereotypes must, at bottom, spring from a disagreement
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objective method of determining whether groups are truly being
treated equally.
Despite this difficulty, the Supreme Court has had to find a
meaning for equal protection. Its search for meaning in the Clause has
led it to employ a variety of methodologies. Before 1937, the Court
sometimes decided equal protection cases based on the extent to which
the challenged statute classified in a way that deviated from common
law regulation." On this theory, the common law, as the presumed
natural result of legal development applied by apolitical judges,
provided an objective reference point against which to judge the
appropriateness of classifications. 5 This approach sought to uncover
natural, or objective, social relations as the anchor for the requirement
of equality before the law, much like Lochner-era jurisprudence, of
which it was a contemporary, sought to determine whether social
legislation undermined natural rights to contract protected in the Due
Process Clause."
After 1937, the theory derived from footnote 4 of UnitedStates v
Carolene Products Co. was thought to provide a comprehensive
mechanism for determining, if not the actual reasonableness of a
classification, then at least the degree of scrutiny with which the Court
would examine it.47 Carolene's influence on equal protection law is
well known, but its implications merit some consideration. Briefly, the
theory suggests that equal protection claims should be evaluated based
on the challenged party's ability to protect its interests in the political
process. If a burdened group was determined to be so able, Carolene
required that courts apply only the most minimal test of rationality to

with the judgments that lie behind the stereotype: judgments about the propriety of the
options left to individuals or the burdens imposed on them" Id. at 1075 (emphasis in
original).
44. Compare, e.g., Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 262-63
(1936), with Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1936) (reaching
opposite results with regard to different provisions of New York law regulating competition in
the milk business, largely based on whether the regulation mirrored the market distinctions
that surfaced during the previous period of common law governed regulation).
45. The apolitical character of the courts that developed common law rules was
important to the pre-1937 structure of equal protection. By erecting as the reference point for
equal protection claims a set of rules developed by judges, courts were able to claim that they
were guarding against the "class legislation" or class favoritism that they saw as a likely result
of the political process. SeegenerallyHowARDGILLMAN, THE CONSTITrION BESIEGED: THE
RiSE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER EA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).

46.
47.
48.

See id
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See id
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the classification. 9 By contrast, if a government action burdened a
particular national or religious minority, or more generally a "discrete
and insular" minority that faced "prejudice," then more searching
scrutiny would be appropriate. This much is standard, and well
understood."
While Carolene's political process theory has never served as the
sole vehicle for conceptualizing equal protection in the modem era, it
has played an important role in the development of the three-tiered
scrutiny scheme that characterizes modem equal protection law.5'
Consequently, if that theory is based, even in part, on concerns about
judicial competence to spot equal protection violations, rather than on
its accuracy in actually spotting unconstitutional conduct, then the way
is open, at least preliminarily, for a larger congressional role in
vindicating equal protection.
49. See id.
50. Footnote 4 goes beyond this situation, to address others in which judicial
deference may be unwarranted. In particular, it addresses situations in which the challenged
government action appears to contravene one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and in
which the government action impacts the workings of the political process. The latter of
these situations reflects another occurrence of the same political process malfunction
motivating the footnote's concern about discrete and insular minorities, discussed in the text.
In both situations, the political process cannot be trusted to produce a result that is more or
less public-regarding, because the legislature would be motivated either to shut down political
participation to entrench itself in power, or to ignore the concerns of groups that, by
definition, do not enjoy political clout.
The situation posed by government action that contravenes a Bill of Rights' provision is
different. The Court's refusal to defer in such situations reflects its understanding that there is
a democratic mandate for judicial review in those cases, a mandate that derives from the
explicit limitations enacted by the people when ratifying the Amendments. The Court's
refusal to defer also reflects the greater confidence the Court has in its own capabilities, not
just when there is an explicit text, but when that text enshrines rules that are more determinate
than those created by the Court under the rubric of substantive due process. The equal
protection guarantee would be just as indeterminate, requiring judicial deference except,
again, where the legislative process could not be trusted.
51.
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43
(1985) (rejecting heightened scrutiny for classifications involving the mentally retarded,
based on similar factors); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-88 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (arguing in favor of heightened scrutiny for gender classifications based on factors
akin to those noted in Carolene); see also, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), affd on othergrounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (arguing for heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications based on Carolene's factors). See generally
JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). The
fundamental rights strand of equal protection relies less on Carolene,although it should be
noted that the two rights embraced within that strand but not within modem substantive due
process, travel and voting, deal with situations addressed by Carolene,respectively, burdening
political outsiders and closing off the standard method of political redress. Carolenes
political process theory has also been thought to play a great role in the post-1937 Court's
increased solicitude for religious minorities and free speech. See Michael Klarman, An
InterpretiveHistoryofModern Equal Protection,90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 246 (1991).
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In fact, Caroleneis quite consistent with a concern about relative
institutional competences. The text of the opinion to which footnote 4
is appended enacts a presumption that facts exist supporting the
legislature's judgment, except when the statute comes within one of the
categories specified in the footnote." This language deserves consideration.
In general, presumptions can reflect either confidence that the
presumed fact does in fact exist, problems with proving the existence
of such a fact, or a simple policy preference for the side benefiting
from the presumption.3
It is at least arguable that the presumption enacted in Carolene
reflects the second of these uses, that is, courts' relative incompetence
to second-guess legislatures regarding the existence of the facts
necessary to support the constitutionality of the challenged statute.
Caroleneappeared at the end of, and as a response to, an era of judicial
imperialism, when the Supreme Court aggressively reviewed laws for
conformance with the Court's constitutional vision of class-neutral
legislation anchored in the assumed neutrality of the common law.
The Court's attempt to enforce this vision caused severe strains,
starting as early as the 1890s and increasing up until 1937, as that
vision forced courts to distinguish valid police-power regulations from
invalid class-biased legislation. 4 Thus, workplace sanitation laws were
distinguished from minimum wage laws, which were in turn
distinguished from maximum working hours laws, which in turn were
distinguished from hours laws benefiting all workers and those
benefiting women, or those benefiting miners and those benefiting
bakers. 5 The collapse of the Court's serious attempt to distinguish
public-regarding from faction-based laws surely suggests that
Carolene'spresumption in favor of legislative judgments was based as
much on an admission of institutional incompetence as from a sudden
understanding that almost all social and economic legislation was
constitutional in some abstract sense.
Occasionally, the Court has gone beyond process theory in
interpreting equal protection. Race classifications present an interesting

52. See Carolene,304 U.S. at 153.
53.
See, e.g., ROGER C. PARK, DAVID P LEONARD & STEVEN H. GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE
LAW 103-04 (1998).
54. For a description and analysis of this struggle from the 1890s to 1937, including
descriptions of the Court's treatment of these particular types of laws, see GILLMAN, Supm
note 45, at 101-293.
55. See id.
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example. 6 The Court's longstanding skepticism about race classifications, beginning with Korematsu v United States," could easily have
been justified by process-based concerns. African-Americans were
surely on Justice Stone's mind when he spoke in Caroleneof prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities,58 and Justice Murphy's dissent
in Korematsu, while never citing Carolene, illustrates how social
ostracism, physical and cultural differences, and simple dislike
combined to create the inaccurate stereotyping that characterized the
Japanese exclusion orders. 9 But process-based concerns were never
primary in the Court's explanations for its race jurisprudence. The preBrown cases dealing with segregation in higher education focused
simply on whether the separate school was in fact equal." Brown itself
indicating the inherent tension between
relied on sociological evidence
"separate" and "equal,"62 and the post-Brown per curiam opinions were
devoid of any analysis. 3 In recent years, where the focus has shifted to
affirmative action plans that benefit racial minorities, the fit between
the doctrine and process theory has become even more tenuous,
calling forth either a halfhearted, unconvincing explanation or a denial
of process theory's relevance altogether.'
The Court's thinking about race reflects its confidence in its own
ability to distinguish between benign and invidious classifications, at
least with regard to certain classification tools. The affirmative action
cases of the past fifteen years have made it especially clear that the
Court considers race classifications suspect on their own merits, as
presumptively unreasonable, without any help from intermediating
tools such as process analysis. Even Grutter v Bollinger, in which
56.
Gender presents another example, but its explication will wait until the Article
develops its theory further. See infra Part W.A.
57.
323 US. 214, 216 (1944).
See304 U.S. at 153.
58.
59.
See Korematsut 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
60.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950) (graduate
61.
school); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (law school).
347 U.S. at 494-95.
62.
See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395, 395 (1964) (per curiam) (city
63.
auditorium); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (public facilities);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (public golf course), rev'g 223 E2d 93
(5th Cir. 1955); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(public beaches), affrg220 E2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989)
64.

(suggesting that political process theory cuts against the constitutionality of the affirmative
action plan at issue because blacks constituted 50% of the population of the city and
controlled five of nine city council seats of the city that enacted the preference).
65.

539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
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the Court applied a less strict version of strict scrutiny, seems to reflect
a Court that has come to its own conclusion about the acceptability of
race classifications in higher education, rather than accepting
educational affirmative action because of some process-based
explanation.6" By eschewing the intermediating tool of process-based
explanations, the Court has found direct meaning in the Clause itself.
In so doing, it draws into sharp relief the indirect, derivative meaning
to be gleaned from its application of the rational basis standard to other
classifications. As suggested earlier, the derivative nature of the
Court's statements in rational basis cases suggests potential
congressional authority to go beyond them.
Of course, in a world where only courts make constitutional
determinations, the distinction between abstract constitutionality and a
court's particular level of deference makes no practical difference. In
such a world, if the burden of persuasion is on the challenger to prove
unconstitutionality by some high standard, then in all likelihood the
statute is constitutional exactly because a court will likely uphold it.
But in an alternate world, where other entities possess at least some
authority to make constitutional decisions, the distinction does make a
difference. In particular, if the presumption of constitutionality reflected
in the rational basis standard reflects limitations on courts' competence
to make a constitutional determination, then space exists for other
branches to speak to those issues. In such a situation, constitutional
lawmaking space (if not necessarily "interpretive" space) remains
unfilled by courts, and thus presumably should be fillable by other
branches. The political question doctrine serves as a rough analogy:
if, as the Court states, the existence of a political question depends in
part on whether the decision requires recourse to standards that are not
judicially manageable, 7 then decisions about what the Constitution
means are made by other branches. Analogously, this Article argues
that the rational basis standard reflects the Court's understanding that
standards for judging the reasonableness of some classifications are
66. For example, nowhere in Grutter's less-than-strict strict scrutiny is there found the
argument that affirmative action is acceptable because it represents the white majority's
decision to burden itself, the obvious process-based justification for allowing affirmative
action. Cf John H. Ely, The ConstitutionalityofReverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. Cn. L.
REv. 723, 739-41 (1974) (arguing that to cure society of racism there must be many more
African-American professionals, and to do this race must be taken into account when
allocating opportunities).
67. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that alleged equal
protection violations related to state apportionment statutes did not present nonjusticiable
political questions).
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simply beyond judicial ken. To complete the political question
analogy, as the textual commitment of a decision to another branch of
government justifies commitment of that issue to that branch, so too
Section 5 is evidence that some constitutional decisions are in fact
"committed" to Congress, or at least that Congress has a role along
with the Court in making them.
In sum, both the very nature of equal protection claims and the
font of modem equal protection law are consistent with an institutional
competence-based congressional authority to vindicate the equal
protection guarantee. This argument is buttressed by the Court's
explanations of its equal protection doctrine, which follow in Part I.B.
Those explanations focus largely on the proper role of courts in
reviewing legislative classifications. They indicate that the Court's
self-perceived role requires it to stop short of making conclusive
pronouncements about what equal protection requires. This Article
argues that the incompleteness of the Court's pronouncements leaves a
constitutional lawmaking hole that may be appropriate for Congress to
fill.
B

The Significance ofthe RationalBasis Standard

1.

The Theoretical Grounding of the Rational Basis Standard

In considering the completeness of the Court's pronouncements
about equal protection, this Article focuses on the Court's statements
about the rational basis standard. Does the Court's decision to apply
rational basis signal its belief that the law is most likely constitutional
in some abstract sense, thus justifying such deferential review? Or
does such a decision imply that courts are only competent to give the
law the most deferential review, even though such review might allow
significant unconstitutional conduct to slip through? It speaks to the
degree to which we have internalized the idea of judicial supremacy
that we might have to think a moment before distinguishing between
these possibilities. But the few instances in which the difference has
either been asserted or become relevant make it clear that the
difference exists, even if largely submerged.68
Unquestionably, the Court can impose limits on its own lawdeclaring power that are not commanded by the Constitution.
68.
One well-known illustration of this distinction was President Jefferson's
pardoning of individuals convicted of violating the Alien and Sedition Act on the ground that
the law was unconstitutional. On this issue, see generally Paul Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 STAN. L. RE. 585 (1975).

536

TULANE LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 79:519

Justiciability limitations and the political question doctrine present
perhaps the clearest examples; in addition to their constitutional
dimensions, both of these doctrines also reflect courts' prudential
decisions not to decide a case." The question for us is whether rational
basis review reflects an analogous prudential limit, not on the
appropriateness of a court hearing a claim at all, but rather on the
aggressiveness with which it will conduct that review. On this
question the Court has been ambivalent. In applying the rational basis
standard, the Court has spoken of what the Equal Protection Clause
requires, and in upholding statutes, it has spoken of those laws
satisfying the Constitution."0 But such statements do not prove that the
rational basis standard itself represents the extent of the Constitution's
commands. Rather, these statements, as expressions of the results in
those cases-normally, that the government wins-are consistent with
both a view that in the abstract the Constitution demands nothing more
than rational basis review and a view that rational basis scrutiny
represents the best the Court can offer in deciding the case in front of
it.
A better source for understanding the status of the rational basis
standard is the Court's more thorough explanations of it. It is fair to
take the Court at its precise word in such situations, where it selfconsciously explains its decisional method, as opposed to where it
simply announces the result of a case. In explaining the rational basis
standard, the Court sometimes refers to it as a paradigm of judicial
restraint.7' That description of the rational basis standard deserves
some attention. Presumably, if the Court saw the rational basis
standard as the abstract limit of the Equal Protection Clause's scope in
cases other than those affecting suspect classes or fundamental rights,
then we might expect to see more discussion about the federalism
69.
See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) (discussing prudential
limits on standing); Baker, 369 U.S. at 216-17 (finding a mixture of constitutional and
prudential concerns in cases held to be political questions).
70.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 106 (2003)
(holding that a state tax of 36% on slot machines, while riverboat machines were taxed only
20%, did not violate cqual protection guarantees); Nc:dlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1992) (holding that a challenged California property tax and assessment system did not
violate .the equal protection guarantee).
71.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 n. 10 (2003); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 376, 383 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993); see also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) ("The
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.").
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implications of heightened scrutiny, and less about the problems
inherent injudicialscrutiny in particular.72
Part of the explanation for this lack of discussion about
federalism in rational basis cases may lie in the existence of an equal
protection component to the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the
federal government, which the Court generally considers to be the
exact replica of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee.73 Because a rational basis standard justified by federalism
concerns would not apply to the Fifth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee, and thus would create different constitutional tests for
federal and state classifications, the Court may well have decided
simply to tie both rational basis standards to judicial incompetence."
Alternatively, it bears repeating that criticisms of the Supreme
Court before 1937 focused largely on the Court's assertion of the
ability to discern constitutional lines that distinguished between, for
example, public-regarding and class-based legislation, direct and
indirect effects on interstate commerce, and intelligible statutory
guidance and unconstitutionally vague delegations. The post-1937
Court's retreat from attempts to draw such lines suggests the more
deferential modern tests may be based on concerns about judicial
competence.7 '

However explained, though, the link between the

rational basis standard and judicial incompetence creates, at least in
theory, room for congressional supplementation of the standard.
72. In fairness, opinions discussing the rational basis standard also observe that the
government is allowed some play in the joints, and that equal protection does not normally
require a perfect fit between ends and means. See, e.g., Beach Communications,508 U.S. at
315. As this Article later explains, however, this observation does not precisely correspond to
the extraordinary deference that characterizes normal rational basis review, which ultimately
remains based on limitations inherent in judicial review. See infa notes 135-136 and
accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding
that the review to be accorded to federal affirmative action contracting set-asides should be
the same as that accorded similar set-asides instituted by state governments). On the general
question of whether the equal protection guarantees applicable to the federal and state
governments should be treated the same, see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the
FourteenthAmendmenA 77 MicH. L. REv. 981, 995-96 (1979).
74. This is not to say that federalism concerns are never mentioned when the Court
explains the rational basis standard. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985) ("[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, the
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect
for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and
to what extent those interests should be pursued."). Obviously, even this reference to
federalism comes with a companion reference to the separation of powers, namely, the
appropriate role of courts as compared with legislatures.
75.
See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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The Court's statements about the institutional roles foundation for
the rational basis standard also find strong support in underlying equal
protection doctrine. Most notably, Carolene's solicitude for discrete
and insular minorities suggests that, by contrast, politically competitive
groups should be required to fight their battles in the legislature and
generally barred from seeking judicial protection when they lose.76
Indeed, the Court has located this conception of the rational basis
standard in the underlying governing structure established in the
Constitution: as the Court has stated on numerous occasions, "[t]he
Constitutionpresumes that,absent some reason to infer antipathy, even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.""
Finally, a basic component of the rational basis test itself also
supports the argument that that test is one fundamentally grounded in
judicial restraint. Rational basis review allows courts to hypothesize a
governmental interest that might be furthered by the challenged
classification. Theoretically, a rational basis standard could exist in
which the court discerns the actual intent of the legislature, and then
applies very deferential review to the link between that intent and the
classification. Justice Brennan called for this type of review,78 which
would truly be a rational basis "test." But courts' license to hypothesize the government interest at stake remains a solid part of the
doctrine. There is good sense in this rule, given the well-known
difficulty in identifying, and the conceptual challenge in even
imagining, a real and unitary legislative intent. Nevertheless, such
hypothesizing, as necessary as it might be, generates results that
simply cannot be described as authoritative statements about the
classification's arbitrariness. Such hypothesizing may be unavoidable,
and even good judicial practice, but that conclusion simply means that
courts are often unable to conduct the ends-means fit analysis that
ostensibly comprises the doctrine.

76.
See304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
77. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. at 313; Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17 (1992); U.S. R.R. Ret.
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 n.12 (1980) (quoting Badley).
78. See Fritz,449 U.S. at 185 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679, 682 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (calling for, in
dormant commerce power cases, an inquiry into the state's actual motivation in enacting the
challenged law, and then a determination of whether that motivation, if a legitimate one, was
rationally related to the law).
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The Court's Decision to Apply Rational Basis: Cleburne

Beyond the Court's explanation and application of the rational
basis test, its analysis of when the test applies also sheds light on its
ultimate meaning. In City of Cleburne v CleburneLiving Center,Inc.,
the Court provided an unusually thorough explanation of its decision
to employ the rational basis standard rather than a higher level of
scrutiny." The Court's rejection of higher scrutiny provides insights
into the Court's understanding of rational basis.
In Ceburne,the Court reviewed a city's decision to deny a zoning
variance that would have allowed a group home for the mentally
retarded to locate in a residential area." While the Court ultimately
struck down the city's decision, it did so based on rational basis
scrutiny, rejecting the appellate court's decision to grant quasi-suspect
class status to the mentally retarded." The Court began its suspect
class inquiry by noting that all parties agreed that the mentally retarded
were in fact relevantly different from mainstream society, in their
reduced ability to function. 2 Appropriate treatment of that group, the
Court observed, was "a difficult and often a technical matter, very
much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not
by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary."83 The Court
then noted the legislative response to the issues faced by the retarded, a
response that the Court concluded "belie[d] a continuing antipathy or
prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the
judiciary."' The Court then combined these three observations-that
the mentally retarded are relevantly different, that the differences
required professional judgments about how best to respond, and that
legislatures have gone some distance toward addressing their unique
problems-to conclude that "governmental consideration of those
differences in the vast majority of situations is not only legitimate but
also desirable.""
Still focusing on the fact that the mentally retarded were different
from mainstream society, and noting the beneficial differentiation
reflected in the legislation the Court cited, the Court then expressed
concern that heightened review would jeopardize such beneficial
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

473 U.S. 432,442-46 (1985).
Id.at 436-37.
Seeid at440-41.
See id at 442.
Id.at 443.
Id.
Id at 444.
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differential treatment.86 Because it might be difficult for a nonexpert
court to distinguish between truly invidious laws and those that only
seemed so, the Court concluded that government must be given "a
certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in
shaping and limiting their remedial efforts. 87
Completing its suspect class analysis, the Court restated its
conclusion that the legislative response to mental retardation belied the
conclusion that the mentally retarded were politically powerless, and
thus in need of judicial solicitude." Finally, the Court suggested that,
even if the mentally retarded did satisfy the criteria for suspect class
status, the Court would still hesitate to grant it:
[I]f.. .the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect ... itwould be
difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups
who have perhaps immutable disabilities ... who cannot themselves
mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some
degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need
mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and
the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to
do so9

Taken as a whole, Clebume's suspect class analysis speaks far
more of judicial competence than confidence in the underlying
constitutionality of classifications based on mental retardation. The
insight underlying most of the Court's analysis was the reality of
difference between the mentally retarded and mainstream society.9°
That difference, being one that almost necessarily made at least some
classifications appropriate, led the Court explicitly to recognize its
inability to distinguish between beneficial and invidious government
conduct.9
Of course, the Cleburne Court did express confidence that "the
vast majority" of legislation singling out the mentally retarded was
"not only legitimate, but desirable,"92 and thus, presumably, constitutional even in the abstract sense. But this conclusion was derivative
rather than direct. Specifically, it was based on examples of clearly
86.
See id. at 444-45. In particular, the Court noted that some beneficial
classifications of the mentally retarded, such as state-mandated special education, "might be
perceived to disadvantage" the retarded. See id at 444.
87. Id. at 445.
88.
See id.
89. Id. at 445-46.
90. See id at 442.
91.
See id. at 445.
92.
Id. at 444.
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beneficial singling out by a society the Court labeled as "civilized and
decent."93 In turn, that label-a crucial one, which essentially
disqualified the mentally retarded from suspect class eligibility under
the literal terms of footnote 494-must have flowed from the Court's
confidence that a society that had taken such great pains to assist the
retarded should generally be trusted to have their best interests at heart,
at least where direct, judicially accessible evidence does not point to
the contrary. Indeed, the derivativeness of the Court's conclusion is
made clear in the final sentence of the Court's suspect class analysis:
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may
legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions, and because
both State and Federal Governments have recently committed
themselves to assisting the retarded, we will not presume that any given
legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is
rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.95
To conclude that the Court's use of rational basis is based on such
a derivative analysis, rather than on direct judicial confidence in the
reasonableness of a classification, does not by itself suggest that
Congress has broader power under Section 5. It does, however, reflect
the existence of a vacuum in which constitutional norms are not fully
enforced by the courts. Because that space exists due to institutional
considerations-that is, the Court's own estimation of its inability to
derive and apply norms-it makes sense to consider whether
Congress's unique abilities and place in the government system justify
conferral of authority on it, via Section 5.
The next Part of this Article examines in more detail the
institutional differences between legislatures and courts, in order to
identify more precisely the qualities of the former that make them
better suited to making at least certain types of determinations about
It concludes that several qualities normally
equal protection."
attributed more to Congress than the courts are relevant to the issues
raised by equal protection. Untangling the differences between courts
93. The full quote reads as follows: "Such legislation [as cited by the Court in the
immediately preceding paragraph] reflects the real and undeniable differences between the
retarded and others. That a civilized and decent society expects and approves such legislation
indicates that governmental consideration of those differences ...is not only legitimate but
also desirable." Id.
94. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citing
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" as a special condition that might justify
heightened judicial review of government action).
95. Cleburne,473 U.S. at 446.
96. See infia Part II.
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and legislatures on these points will leave us with a rough sketch of the
relevant functional differences between Congress and the courts,
which should assist us in determining the appropriate scope of the
Section 5 power. The Article then applies the lessons learned to
Cleburne, illustrating how Congress's capabilities translate into a case
where the Court was especially concerned about its own role.97
Two more tasks will then remain. First, given this Article's
assumption of judicial supremacy," it will be necessary to consider
how congressional "enforcement" should relate to judicial "interpretation." Second, it will be necessary to consider the federalism
implications of a broad congressional-enforcement power. If we
assume that the Equal Protection Clause does not give the federal
government (whether federal courts or Congress) plenary revisory
power over state legislation, this analysis demands an understanding of
the enforcement power that appropriately cabins Congress, just as the
rational basis standard cabins the courts. In short, these two latter
tasks address how our emerging understanding of congressional
authority relates to the authority of the two other players in the game:
the federal courts (the discussion of the meaning of the terms
"enforcement" and "interpretation") and the states (the federalism
discussion). "
Part II concludes by suggesting in general how this approach
nevertheless leaves Congress within a properly limited sphere of
authority.'1° As will become clear, the approach to Section 5 sketched
in Part II would, if applied to the hilt, provide Congress with broad
congressional authority to act. The last part of Part II explains how
such power can best be understood to comport with the understanding
that neither Section 5 nor the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole was
intended to provide the federal government with a general power to
overturn any and all actions of state governments.
H.

CONGRESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

A.

Legislative Competence andEqualProtection

Our initial insight that equal protection issues require judgments
about social reality in a way that other constitutional provisions do not
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See infra Part II.B.
See supm notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
See infiaPart IID.
See !nfha Part ILE.
See inhfa Part I.E.
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suggests, in some general way, Congress's "institutional competence"
to play a special role in vindicating the equal protection guarantee. It
is certainly logical to consider a legislature (and especially the national
legislature) the governmental institution that most accurately mirrors
society. Thus, why not trust it to determine which groups merit similar
treatment under particular circumstances, and which do not, at least
when legal sources do not provide a judicially accessible answer? But
an intuition about institutional competence is obviously insufficient.
Follow-up questions immediately arise. Competence about what?
What characteristics of legislatures endow them with this competence?
How much deference does this competence differential justify? What
if the legislature would tend to find a particular classification
appropriate when a judicial determination found the opposite?
This Subpart of the Article begins to answer these important
questions. It considers four characteristics of legislatures that render
them better able than courts to determine when differential treatment is
unreasonable and to remedy perceived violations.
1.

Legislatures' Popular Mandate

Most fundamentally, legislatures are presumed to have a popular
mandate for their actions, based on legislators' electoral success and
accountability. That mandate should empower them to go beyond
courts in reordering social relations to conform to the broad requirements of equal protection. Such a mandate may be necessary, or at
least useful, in light of the work equal protection is sometimes
expected to perform in our system.
Consider the intent requirement in antidiscrimination law
announced in Washingiton v Davis.'°2 The Davis Court expressed a
great deal of concern about a disparate impact rule, finding it to be
unsupported by case law,"° inconsistent with the Court's underlying
theory of equal protection as an individual guarantee,'" and troubling
in its broad implications.' 5 With regard to the last point, the Court
noted that a disparate impact rule would subject a whole variety of tax,
social welfare, and regulatory programs to stringent judicial scrutiny,
because those programs impacted minorities, who tend to be poorer,
differently than whites, who tend as a group to be wealthier.' 6 The
102.

426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).

103. Seeid at 239-45.
104. See id. at 245-47.
105. See id. at 247-48.

106. Id at 248.
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Court also noted, though, that Congress had mandated a disparate
impact test in the field of employment discrimination generally (that is,
applicable to private and public employers, and authorized by the
Commerce Clause), and implied that
Congress might also be able to
17
legislate such a rule in other areas.
Surely one justification counseling congressional over judicial
action on an issue like the intent requirement is the broad effect a
disparate impact rule would have on government and society. When
such a momentous rule is not compelled by unambiguous sources such
as a clear textual command, its legitimacy, not just as policy, but as an
understanding of what the Constitution requires, depends at least in
part on whether it emanates from a politically accountable institution.
For example, it may be more legitimate for Congress, rather than a
court, to decide that equal protection requires the repeal of college
draft deferments or the prohibition of regressive sales taxes, both of
which favor wealthier whites over poorer racial or ethnic minorities.
The lack of clear constitutional prohibitions against such long-standing
practices, either in the text or derived from judicially accessible interpretive tools, when combined with the fundamental changes such
decisions would work in governmental operations, counsel congressional rather than judicial action. This is true for the simple reason that
fundamental changes in government policy normally should be made
by representative branches.
Of course, this is not to say that controversial or radical changes
in society cannot emanate from the Court under the auspices of an
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Cases such as Brown v
Board ofEducatio'0 8 make clear that the Court can sometimes either
107. See id at 247-48; see also id at 238 n.10 (noting that in 1972, Title VII had been
amended to cover federal employees). It is unclear what source of power the Court had in
mind when it suggested that Congress could legislate a disparate impact rule going beyond
employment and affecting the "tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and licensing statutes"
on which the Court had declined to impose its own disparate impact rule. The two main
sources of that power would be the Commerce Clause and Section 5. However, for a Court
that had heard oral argument in NationalLeagueofCities v Usery,426 U.S. 833 (1976), the
day after it heard the argument in Davis, and decided the cases less than three weeks apart, it
is quite possible that a majority of the Court thought 'he Commerce Power did not authorize
Congress to regulate how states designed their tax, welfare, and regulatory policies. Thus, it
is likely that the Davis Court had the Section 5 power in mind when it made this statement.
Ultimately, the argument in the text does not depend on the resolution of this issue. The
point of the Davis example is to illustrate how and why the Court might be unwilling to
impose broad-based changes on government structure in order to satisfy possible equal
protection requirements, and how, institutionally, Congress may be better suited to impose
them.
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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precipitate a social movement for equality or at least join in at an early
stage, even when traditional constitutional interpretation tools yield
ambivalent answers. In Brown, those tools did yield quite ambivalent
answers: the Court had to deal with the fact that segregation was not
clearly prohibited by the bare text of the Clause, was quite possibly
acceptable to a large number of those voting for its ratification, was
widely practiced at ratification, and had been officially accepted by the
Court for a half-century. Nevertheless, the Court discounted the
ambivalence of the Drafters' intent and the historical evidence,
distinguished and then overturned Plessy v Ferguson,' 9 and took the

correct step of requiring the overhaul of the nation's public schools.
Still, it is worth considering Brown's at best partial success and
wondering whether integration would have been more successful if
Congress had more aggressively assisted the Court."' Indeed, the steps
Congress did take-most notably the conditioning of federal education
funds on desegregation-helped quicken the pace of change." This is
not to say that integration would have occurred immediately,
peacefully, and comprehensively had the effort been led by Congress.
The anti-Brown rhetoric of segregationists, criticizing Brown as a
judicial usurpation,"2 was largely opportunistic-that is, much, if not
most, of that opposition was based on the rejection of integration itself,
not the fact that integration was being "illegitimately" imposed by
courts. Still, the enhanced legitimacy that undeniably flows when a
social revolution is led by Congress, rather than the courts, renders the
former an indispensable player in making such revolutions succeed. "'
This is especially the case when judicial pronouncements are based on
indeterminate constitutional language, of which the Equal Protection
Clause is a prime exemplar. This is not to say that those judicial
pronouncements are illegitimate. Nor is it to say that, as a matter of
109. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In a technical sense, Plessywas not overturned by Brown,
given the latter's emphasis on the importance of education in twentieth-century U.S. life and
the empirical evidence suggesting that, in the context of children's education, separate could
never be equal. It took the per curiam opinions of the subsequent several years, which struck
down Jim Crow laws across the entirety of government action, to provide the real overruling
of Plessys holding that separate but equal facilities did not offend the Constitution.
110. See generallyWilliam D. Araiza, Courts, Congress,and EqualProtection: What
Brown Teaches UsAbout the Secton 5 Power,47 How. L.J. 199 (2004).
111. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 46-54 (1991).

112. For example, the so-called "southern manifesto" of southern congressmen's
opposition to Brown spoke in these terms. See 102 CONG. REC. H4515 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1956) (statement of Rep. Smith).
113. See generallyAraiza,supra note 110.
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institutional role, courts should stand on the sidelines when
controversial equality issues arise. It is, however, to suggest that in
some cases the popular legitimacy attached to legislative action makes
such action a necessary part of the attempt fully to implement the
guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.
2.

Line-Drawing by Courts and Legislatures

Additionally, legislatures can draw certain lines better than courts.
In particular, legislatures can embrace distinctions that are arbitrary, in
the sense of being based not on principled reasoning but instead on the
practical need for a line, even if that line could be drawn in another
place with just as much justification. In Archibald Cox's words, this
type of line is arbitrary "in the sense that it makes a sharp cut off at
some point in a range shading from one extreme to the other by
infinitely small differences of degree.""
Judicial drawing of such arbitrary lines creates problems for
reasons relating to the source of judicial legitimacy The legitimacy of
judicial line-drawing derives largely from a court being able to defend
its decisions as the results of reasoned decisionmaking, explainable
(and explained) in terms of legal principle."5 That type of reasoningderiving principles from earlier cases, applying linguistic and other
interpretive tools to ambiguous texts, finding underlying structural
principles in a particular textual provision, and then applying the
resulting law to the facts of the case-is in tension with the linedrawing described by Professor Cox."6 By contrast, Congress does not
gain its legitimacy from principled explanation, but instead by simply
acting in the public good, constrained only by barebones procedural
requirements,"' by textual"8 and penumbral"9 boundaries on its power,
114. Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitulional Determinations, 40
CrNCINNATI L. REV. 199, 230 (1971).

115. For example, the extent to which courts may decide cases without issuing
precedential opinions is an issue. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 E3d 898 (8th
Cir.), vacated as moo4 235 F3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To continue the
analogy, agencies, another nonelected branch of government, are generally required to
provide reasons for their actions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) (requiring that an
agency provide a basis for its decision to promulgate a rule); 5 U.S.C § 557(c) (requiring that
an agency provide a basis for its decision); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). For a well-known statement of the requirement of this
sort of reasoning, see Poe v Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(speaking of substantive due process as a "rational contiuum" rather than a matter of
"unguided speculation").
116. Cox,supanote 114, at 230.
117. See INS v.Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949-51 (1983) (requiring bicameralism and
presentment before Congress can act in a way having legislative effect).
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and by the legitimacy bestowed by elections. As long as it stays within
these broad limits, Congress can act in a plenary fashion. Because it
need not explain itself in the way a court must, it may draw lines that a
court would find difficult to justify as an application of legal principle.
Such an advantage is clearly relevant in the context of the Equal
Protection Clause, which ultimately concerns federal supervision of
state classifications. In supervising those classification decisions,
Congress or a court might also need to draw a line. This Article
suggests that Congress is superior at that task.
Of course, sometimes courts must draw arbitrary lines of the sort
described by Professor Cox.'2° Indeed, this is the situation in a normal
Fourteenth Amendment case, in which the court must evaluate the
claim without the assistance of a Section 5 statute providing a precise
rule of decision. In the course of that evaluation, the court may very
well have to draw the arbitrary line not provided by Congress.
Consider County ofRiveside v McLaughlin."' In that case, the Court
faced the question of how promptly the Constitution required
government to provide a probable cause hearing to an individual
arrested without a judicial warrant.'22 In a previous case, Gerstein v
Pugh, the Court had required that such hearings be conducted
"promptly," while giving states the opportunity to integrate probable
cause determinations into other pretrial proceedings." 3 Unsurprisingly,
such a vague and ambivalent mandate caused a spate of "systemic
challenges" to pretrial procedures that, in the Court's words, put
"federal judges in the role of making legislative judgments and
overseeing local jailhouse operations."'24
Given the need for more guidance, the Court provided it. With
remarkably little analysis, the Court simply announced a rule that
warrantless detentions provided within forty-eight hours were
presumptively constitutional, unless delayed for some inappropriate

118. Such limits would include, but not be limited to, the individual rights guarantees
provided by the Bill of Rights.
119. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996) (prohibiting Congress
from abrogating state sovereign immunity when legislating under its Article I power, based on
the postulates implicit in the Eleventh Amendment); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
188 (1992) (prohibiting Congress from "commandeering" state governmental apparatuses for
federal regulatory uses, based on nontextual requirements of federalism).
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
122. Seeid at 58.
123. 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
124. McLaughin, 500 U.S. at 56.
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reason such as ill will.'25 Longer delays would be presumed unconstitutional and would lead to a finding of a constitutional violation unless
the state proved the existence of an emergency or some other
extraordinary circumstance. 26
The forty-eight-hour rule enunciated in McLaughlin is truly
arbitrary, in the sense used by Professor Cox. It was based neither on
text nor history,2 7 nor even on the accumulated experience of judges
applying a broad principle and over time reaching a consensus as to
what constitutes appropriate delay.'28 This characterization is not
necessarily a criticism, because the announcement of a presumptive
forty-eight-hour rule may have been the best judicial solution to the
problem of particularizing a vague constitutional command. Indeed,
leaving the matter as vague as Gerstein had left it caused the problems
that led the Court to revisit the issue in McLaughlin. 2 Nor would it
have been clearly better for the Court simply to have reviewed the facts
in McLaughlin and decided that the delay was or was not
unreasonable; such a minimalist result would have provided almost no
guidance to the lower courts. Thus, the Court may have done the best
it could. Still, there is surely something jarring about the lack of
judicially cognizable evidence pointing to a bright line and the Court's
enunciation of such a line.
By contrast, Congress could have imposed a forty-eight-hour
requirement with much more legitimacy than the McLaughlin Court,
because it would not have had to justify its choice of forty-eight hours
as the product of legal reasoning. Such a Section 5 statute would not
obviate the need for judicial examination of the issue; however, that
examination would be far easier than the one the Court had to perform
in McLaughlin. For example, a state might argue that a congressionally
imposed forty-eight-hour rule imposed requirements so much more
restrictive on states than that required by the Constitution that it
constituted inappropriate Section 5 legislation. Conversely, a prisoner
might argue that the statutory rule either insufficiently guaranteed his
Sixth Amendment rights (incorporated against the states via the
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. For example, there was no common law rule that such a hearing would have to
take place by the end of the day after the arrest was made.
128. For example, dissenting in McLaughin, Justice Scalia argued that lower courts'
application of the proper legal standard-promptness, without concern for administrative
convenience-yielded a consensus result that, in most cases, twenty-four hours would be
sufficient. See 500 U.S. at 67-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Seeid.at57-58.
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Fourteenth Amendment) or even violated them, if, for example, the
statute immunized complying states from constitutional liability, via
some sort of safe-harbor provision. '
Note, though, that judicial review of these claims would not
involve the Court in the kind of line-drawing it felt compelled to
perform in McLaughlin. The State's argument would require the Court
simply to determine whether the Section 5 statute was congruent and
proportional to the scope of the underlying constitutional right, without
requiring the Court to delineate the scope of that right with complete
precision. The prisoner's argument would again require the Court to
test a precise rule-the federal statute-against underlying constitutional requirements, without requiring that those requirements be
delineated in complete detail. The Court's task in the prisoner's case
would be somewhat harder than in the State's case: while in the State's
claim the Court would simply have to decide whether the statute was
close enough (i.e., congruent and proportional) to the constitutional
rule, the prisoner's claim would require the Court to make a finer
judgment, namely, whether the statute crossed over the constitutional
line, allowing conduct that the Sixth Amendment prohibited. But even
this task is easier than the task in McLaughlin because all the Court
would have to decide is whether the statute crossed over the line,
without having to explain comprehensively, as it felt compelled to do
in McLaughlin, where that line is drawn. In short, the Section 5 statute
would provide a target at which the Court could aim its analysis,
making it unnecessary for the Court to explain the precise metes and
bounds of the underlying constitutional right.'3'
The equal protection guarantee suffers from an even starker lack
of judicially accessible meaning than the Sixth Amendment, thus again
making legislative line-drawing a useful supplement to judicial action.
In the case of equal protection, the line-drawing problem flows from
130. Cf, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (striking down a
federal law prescribing the standard for use of confessions as inconsistent with the
constitutional rule the Court held was enunciated in Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)). A similar problem was posed in Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643-46

(1966), when New York argued that section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act itself was
unconstitutional in that it amounted to invidious discrimination between different groups of
non-English speakers. See ihzfa notes 198-202 and accompanying text.

131. Of course, current Section 5 jurisprudence does speak of the Court having to
determine "the metes and bounds" of the constitutional right sought to be enforced. See, e.g.,
Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).

But because

the Section 5 inquiry is

ultimately concerned with the degree of fit between the enforcement statute and the
underlying right, there is less need to determine those "metes and bounds" with the same
precision as when the ultimate issue is the scope of the constitutional right itself.
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the lack of legal standards that help courts distinguish between
reasonable and unreasonable classifications. A decisional device such
as the denomination of a group as a suspect class might help a court
decide the issue, but, as suggested by Cleburne, such a device at best
provides only an approximation of the constitutional requirement;
statutes might still be struck down under the rational basis standard,'32
while they might be upheld under a stricter one.'33 Moreover,
determining whether a group is a suspect class is itself an exercise in
line-drawing, as the Cleburne Court made clear when it expressed its
discomfort at the prospect that granting that status to the mentally
retarded might make it impossible to deny it to groups such as the aged
and the infirm.'34
This analysis suggests a larger congressional role in enforcing the
equal protection guarantee, given the nature of the inquiry that equal
protection mandates. In particular, Section 5 statutes, as lines drawn
by an entity that draws its legitimacy from a source other than its
pretensions to accuracy in discerning constitutional rules, need not be
the result of the interpretive process, with all its constraints and
methodological requirements. But the rules in Section 5 laws still
need to be anchored in some legal principle. This issue-a crucial one
going to the heart of the Section 5 power-is taken up later in this
Article. For now, it suffices to acknowledge that Congress's superior
flexibility in drawing arbitrary lines comes with a price-the need to
justify those lines as something other than an interpretation of the
Constitution. The basic point remains, however: Congress does have
more line-drawing flexibility than courts, and that flexibility should
logically allow Congress a significant role in prescribing rules of
conduct as part of its Section 5 power, especially with regard to equal
protection.

132. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (holding an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution, which prohibited all legislative, judicial, or executive action
designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination, to be an unconstitutional violation of
the equal protection clause); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,448
(1985) (striking down as unconstitutional certain zoning laws that prohibited the
establishment of group homes for the mentally retarded in certain zoning districts); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (striking down a Texas law denying education to noncitizen
children of illegal immigrants, despite their status as a nonsuspect class).
133. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding a race-based
affirmative action policy); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (upholding a gender-based
immigration regulation).
134. See473 U.S. at445-46.
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Congress's Role in Determining Animus

As discussed earlier, the equal protection guarantee applies to all
government classifications, not just to the race classifications that were
undoubtedly at the center of the Drafters' concerns.'35 Yet, it should
also be uncontroversial that the Equal Protection Clause was not
intended to give federal courts (or Congress, via Section 5) a
freewheeling power of review over all state laws that classify.
Government requires experimentation, and it should not be beyond
government's power to make good faith mistakes with regard to the
classifications that will best further its legitimate interests, at least
when those classifications do not touch the forbidden territory of racial
oppression. While to an important degree the rational basis standard
speaks to judicial competence concerns, equal protection's underlying
rule, that states need not be perfect when they draw lines, should also
limit Congress when it uses its Section 5 power.
Thus, the Equal Protection Clause applies to all classifications,
but usually does not require perfect classifications. But if the Clause
does apply, then presumably it must impose some requirement. At the
very least, equal protection should require governmental good faith. If
that good faith is missing, there is no reason to give government the
benefit of the doubt and to allow it to draw imperfect lines. Therefore,
if there is a judicially discovered principle in the Equal Protection
Clause, beyond a guarantee of racial equality, it must be a prohibition
on animus. This Article suggests that the nature of animus is such that
Congress is better able than courts to recognize it.
In theory at least, the rational basis standard guards against
animus. In the rare cases where statutes fail that standard, the Court
often concludes that the statute was motivated by animus against the
burdened group. Such a conclusion logically follows from a failure to
satisfy rational basis: if there is not even a rational argument that a
particular classification might further a legitimate government interest,
then the only possible conclusions are that the government is utterly
irrational or motivated by an illegitimate interest. The first of these
possibilities is extraordinarily rare. 36 As for the second possibility, the

135. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
136. In Allegheny PittsburghCoal Co. v County Commission, the Court struck down
a West Virginia county's acquisition-value tax valuation scheme, holding that it violated a
taxpayer's equal protection rights in light of state law requiring a more uniform tax rate. 488
U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989). Because acquisition-value schemes were upheld three years after
Allegheny, see Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17 (1992), the flaw in the West Virginia
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Court's clearest discoveries of such illegitimate interests are in City of38
37
Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc.' and Romer v Evans,
where, after disposing of the state's arguments that the challenged law
furthered a legitimate state interest, the Court was left with the
conclusion that the statute must have been motivated by animus.' 9
But while sometimes the rational basis standard detects animus,
there is good reason to believe that it does not do a complete job.
Animus-in the Supreme Court's words, "a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group""-can be discovered directly, by

reaching direct conclusions about legislative motivations, or indirectly,
by eliminating all legitimate explanations for a classification, leaving
nothing as a motivation except simple dislike. Cleburne and Romer
provide examples of both methods. In Cleburne, the Court found it

easy to attribute animus to the city's denial of a permit for a group
home for the mentally retarded, as the city defended its actions by,
among other things, reference to residents' fear and dislike of the
mentally retarded and concern about harassment by students at nearby
schools.'4 ' By explicitly citing residents' fears and dislikes as a reason
scheme must have been its irrationality as a means of ensuring the uniformity mandated by
superior state law.
In two cases, the Court struck down as irrational state laws that distinguished between
newer and longer-term state citizens. Hooper Y.Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612,
622-23 (1985), Zobel v Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-62 (1982). These cases are somewhat
different from Allegheny, in that the burdened classes-future immigrants into the statewere in a real way shut out of the decisionmaking process. For this reason, these cases should
probably not be read as true "utter irrationality" cases, but instead as cases where a group was
almost by definition shut out of the political process, thus justifying more critical judicial
scrutiny. That heightened scrutiny was also justified by the federalism concerns inherent in
state laws that created different classes of state citizenship depending on date of arrival. See
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the right to travel as a federal
interest implicated by the statute); id at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same); see also Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (striking down a California law restricting recent arrivals'
welfare benefits to that of their state of origin, based on the federal right to move from state to
state, enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause).
137. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
138. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
139. See id at 634 ("A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us
raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected."); Cleburne,473 U.S. at 450 ("The short of it is that requiring the
permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded ... "). In Cleburne, the inference of animus was more direct, as some of the
justifications offered by the state-e.g., neighborhood fear and dislike of the mentally
retarded who wanted to live nearby-were cited as direct evidence of animus. See id at 44849. In Romer, the inference of animus was more indirect, as it was based on a conclusion
that none of the State's legitimate interests were in fact plausible. See 517 U.S. at 636.
140. U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
141. See Cleburne,473 U.S. at 448.
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for the challenged action, the city made the plaintiffs' case about the
animus lurking in the government's action. 142 In Romer, by contrast,
the state justified its actions by reference to theoretically legitimate
concerns about conservation of law enforcement resources and
protection of the associational rights of small-scale landlords who
preferred not to rent to gays and lesbians.'43 After discounting the
plausibility of these justifications due to the extraordinary disconnect
between them and Amendment 2's scope, 14" the Court concluded that

Amendment 2 could only have been motivated by animus."'
Both of these approaches present problems for courts. First,
indirect imputations of animus, as in Romer, require the Court to go
beyond the normal deferential level of review that characterizes the
rational basis standard. That standard requires only the most tenuous
connection between the classification and a legitimate government
interest; mere over- or under-inclusiveness does not doom the government's action. The fact that the Court demanded a tighter connection
in Romer does not mean that it is willing to do so in every situation;
indeed, such heightened scrutiny is, by its very terms, inconsistent with
the Court's own explication of rational basis review.
Direct identification of animus, as in Cleburne, seems at first
blush a more promising approach. But serious problems attend this
method as well. Government will rarely justify its actions only by
reference to fear and dislike of the burdened group. Indeed, in
Cleburneitself, the city offered other justifications for its action, which
required the Court to engage in the same heightened ends-means
review as in Romer.'" In the absence of official government
incorporation of private biases, direct identification of animus requires
courts to draw conclusions about the subjective intent of government
decisionmakers. Such conclusions are difficult to draw with confidence, and, indeed, the Court has on other occasions cautioned against
overreliance on the evidence necessary to draw such conclusions.'47
142. Seeid.
143. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
144. Adopted by a statewide referendum, Amendment 2 amended the state
constitution to prohibit state actors from recognizing any protected status based on sexual
orientation. Id at 623-24.
145. Seeid at 635.
146. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50 (discounting the plausibility of legitimate
reasons for the permit denial, such as concern about evacuation during floods).
147. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-85 (1968). The Court's
embrace of the intent standard for equal protection claims generally, see Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), is not to the contrary, because the Court has made clear that intent
can be inferred from indirect evidence, in much the same way that animus can be inferred by
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These problems suggest the difficulty the Court has had
explaining its "rational basis plus" cases. Indeed, Justice O'Connor
was recently moved to acknowledge that cases such as Cleburne and
Romer involved something more than traditional rational basis
review,48' a suggestion the49rest of the Court has not been willing to
embrace, at least officially.
Most relevant to the difference between legislative and judicial
competence to find animus, however, is the very nature of the concept.
Animus, as the Court uses that term, is nothing more than a label
placed on an irrational government action where a court suspects that
there is more than mere irrationality afoot. To see why this is so,
consider Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v County Commission, in
which the Court struck down, as unconstitutionally irrational, a
property-tax valuation scheme that overvalued newly purchased
property relative to long-held property.' Unlike most cases in which a
state action was struck down as failing rational basis, the Court's
decision in Allegheny made not even a suggestion that the State's
action was motivated by animus.' The lack of such a suggestion is
completely understandable; after all, nobody would suspect that
society harbors a hatred for recent purchasers of property. But this
explanation indicates the conclusory nature of the label, as something
we attach when we suspect that legislatures have done more than make
a good faith mistake. If animus is indeed simply a label reflecting
such an intuitive judgment, then Congress may be better suited than
courts to reach that judgment, or, at the very least, should share with
the courts some authority to reach it.
Describing animus as a label is simply another way of stating that
it is a value choice, a characterization we choose to give to a
government action. As a value choice, there is every reason to give
Congress at least some authority to make it. Congress, as a national
and representative institution, is far better placed to attach social
meaning to classifications, which is essentially what happens when a
rejecting the plausibility of legitimate reasons for a given classification. SeegenetallyVill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (discussing factors

relevant to a judicial finding of discriminatory intent).
148.
149.

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (concluding that

Cleburnewas the result of traditional rational basis review). Interestingly, Justice O'Connor
joined in that opinion. See id. at 374-76 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
150. 488 U.S. 336, 346 (1989).
151. Seeid at 336-46. ButseeRomerv. Evans,, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996); Clebume,
473 U.S. at 450; U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (all suggesting or

explicitly finding animus).

2005]

EQUAL PROTECTION

court holds a classification to be based on animus. Finding animus
requires consideration not just of the extent to which legitimate
government ends might be served by a particular classification-that
is, traditional ends-means fit analysis-but also of the underlying
message a classification communicates. To return to the example of
Allegheny, we would normally not view as animus-based a
classification of property owners based on when they bought, because
there's nothing in our society that makes us concerned about visceral
dislike of recent property purchasers. But consider a society
transitioning from feudal to capitalistic, where recent property
purchase might be seen as indicating status as a social-order disrupting
parvenu. In such a society, recent property purchasers might well be
the victims of visceral dislike (at least by long-established groups).
Which governmental institution is best suited to determine which of
these two societies we live in? Most of us would say Congress.
4.

Congress as Fact Finder

One institutional advantage the Court has long-conceded to
Congress is the latter's superior fact-finding ability. But even here, the
Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence and its recent federalism
jurisprudence generally have imposed more exacting requirements
than in the past. In United States v Lopez, for example, the Court
expressed a preference for explicit findings linking regulated conduct
to interstate commerce when the link was not otherwise immediately
visible to the Court.' 52 In the Section 5 cases starting with City of
Boerne v Flores,'3 the Court has insisted that the challenged statute be
supported by findings documenting the widespread prevalence of
precisely described conduct. For example, in Kimel v FloridaBoard
of Regents, the Court examined the legislative record for specific
examples of unconstitutionally invidious state-sponsored discrimination (in that case, based on age)."M According to the Court, this careful
review was necessitated by the broad scope of the burdens the
challenged statute placed on states, burdens that went beyond the
152. See 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995). In the next case after Lopez where the Court
struck down a statute as exceeding the commerce power, the Court discounted altogether the
existence of facts tending to show a link between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce, concluding that those facts established the kind of attenuated connection that was
simply insufficient to justify federal regulation. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
614-15 (2000).
153. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
154. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (striking down applicability of the ADEA to the states as
inappropriate Section 5 legislation).
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requirements of the Equal Protection Clause as applied via the rational
basis standard.15 ' The Court found the legislative record inadequate, as
too skimpy or only tangentially related to the unconstitutional conduct
Congress was purporting to deter. 156 In Board of Trustees v Garrett,
the Court insisted on even more precise findings.' 7 In particular, it
refused to consider findings of discrimination by subunits of state
governments; questioned whether the identified instances of state
discrimination amounted to unconstitutional conduct; and concluded
that even if they did, they did not comprise a sufficiently widespread
pattern to justify the challenged statute. 5
Commentators have debated the Court's recent attitude toward
congressional fact-finding, with some considering it disrespectful of a
coordinate branch and uncomprehending of the realities of the
legislative process, and others endorsing it with varying degrees of
enthusiasm.' 9 This Article does not directly join that debate. Rather,
this Article focuses on the type of fact-finding competence that is most
relevant to the argument that, among Fourteenth Amendment rights,
equal protection is uniquely susceptible to congressional action.
Unlike fact-findings relevant to other legal rights, fact-findings with
regard to equal protection ultimately speak to whether a government
classification reflects an illegitimate value choice about the social
status of particular classes. Unlike, for instance, congressional factfindings about the scope of state patent infringements or the adequacy
of state law remedies-findings that, while perhaps deserving of some
deference, can at least be evaluated by a court using methods

155. Idat88-91.
156. See id.at 89 (describing "isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and
legislative reports," discrimination that was traced only to one state, which remained legal
under the challenged statute; and discrimination performed by private entities, tied to state
governments only by analogy).
157. 531 U.S. 356, 368-72 (2001) (striking down applicability of Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to the states, holding it to be inappropriate Section 5
legislation).
158. Seeid
159. See, e.g., Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress.The Supreme Court New 'On The Record' ConstitutionalReview of Fedenal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 328, 329 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative
Record Review, 54 STAN. L. RE. 87, 14143 (2001); Philip P Frickey, The Fool on the HilT
CongressionalFindings,ConstitutionalAdjudication,andUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W
RES. L. RE. 695, 697-98 (1996); Barry Friedman, LegislativeFinchngsandJudicialSignals."
A PositivePoliticalReading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W RES. L. REV. 757, 760
(1996); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress Into an Agency. The Propiety of Requiring
LegislativeFindings,46 CASE W RES.L. REV.731, 733-34 (1996).
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accessible to it"6 -a finding that "refusals to accommodate a disability
amount to behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of
lacking constitutional justification" requires an evaluation of the social
meaning of the state's action, a meaning that a democratically elected
Congress is better suited than a court to attach.'6
Of course, a Congress interested in regulating, say, disabilitybased discrimination must do more than simply announce its value
choice that such discrimination is irrational or animus-driven. In order
to justify imposing burdens on the state, there must be at least some
finding that such a burden is justified by the existence of such
unconstitutional action.'62 But if the constitutional harm of disability
discrimination lay in the social meaning it communicates, and if
Congress is better than courts at determining that social meaning, then
there is surely no justification in the Court requiring, as it did in
Garrett,that the facts found by Congress be sufficient to convince a
court to strike down such conduct as failing rational basis. This is not
to say that courts should never make such judgments; indeed they must
when a plaintiff brings an equal protection challenge against a
classification that is not the subject of a Section 5 statute. But there is
no reason to privilege judicial findings on these issues. Indeed, the
rational basis standard, properly understood, reflects the courts'
acknowledgement of their difficulty in authoritatively concluding that
such facts exist.
As always in the Section 5 context, Congress's latitude to act
must be understood in relation to its power merely to "enforce" the
Fourteenth Amendment. This limitation on the Section 5 power
reflects the Article's starting point that current Supreme Court doctrine
enforcing a line between "enforcement" and "interpretation" is settled
and not the object of disagreement among the Justices.'63 Thus, in the
Section 5 context, Congress's fact-finding competence necessarily
160.

See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.

627, 645-46 (1999) (questioning whether negligent action can amount to infringement of a
patent and thus to deprivation of a property interest); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 696

(1977) (considering the adequacy, for due process purposes, of a post-deprivation remedy for
a violation of a child's liberty interest in not being subject to state-sponsored corporeal

punishment).
161. Gartt,531 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. The literature on this topic is largely addressed to the degree of deference owed

congressional findings of this sort. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 159, at 367
(arguing that Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), must be read as enunciating a
broad rule of deference to facts that Congress might have found to justify a Section 5
enactment); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 159, at 107-08 (same).
163. See supa notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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stands in relation to the Court's own interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, if the appropriate way to understand the
Court's attitude toward age discrimination is that such discrimination is
so rarely constitutionally problematic as to warrant only rational basis
review, then a broad congressional prohibition of such discrimination
might be thought to require convincing facts indicating that much age
discrimination was in fact so irrational as to be unconstitutional. This
was the way the Court reviewed Congress's fact-findings in Kim el."
The Court noted that the group protected by the statute was not a
suspect class; acknowledged the possibility that the problem posed by
age discrimination could have been worse than it thought; and
proceeded to determine whether Congress had in fact so found,
concluding that it had not, or at least that the evidentiary support for
that finding was insufficient.'65
This Article argues, however, that the Court has in fact
misunderstood the implications of a decision to subject a particular
classification, such as age, to only rational basis review. It argues that
such a decision does not mean that almost all such classifications are
constitutional, but instead, that courts do not have the authority to
second-guess the state's judgment. Given its unique characteristics,
Congress should have that authority. This Article argues that the Court
misunderstands what it means to be a nonsuspect class, and what
authority Congress thereby has to consider the reasonableness of such
classifications, and therefore necessarily misunderstands the role of
fact-findings in supporting Section 5 enactments.
Properly understood, Congress's fact-finding competence
addresses more than whether it has found facts that, if a court had
found, would move the latter to hold that equal protection had been
violated. That model of congressional fact-finding reduces Congress
to a pure adjunct of the Court, an inappropriate role when, as in
rational basis cases, the Court has confessed its inability to fully
discern when the Constitution is being violated. Rather, Congress's
ability to find facts should justify its making an independent
determination when the judicially announced constitutional rule is
being violated. Note that the larger question of what constitutes a
constitutional violation is still reserved to the judiciary; in rational
basis cases, this is the rule against arbitrary or invidious classifications.
164. See528 U.S. 62, 82-92 (2000).
165. See id (noting that age is not a suspect classification); id at 89-92 (finding
insufficient evidentiary support for a congressional fact-finding adequate to justify the
ADEA's broader rule).
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This Article argues that Congress is uniquely suited to uncover and
evaluate facts that determine whether or not that rule has been
violated.
B.

Application of These Characteristics Cleburne

The characteristics of legislatures discussed above surface in the
Court's suspect class analysis in Cleburne.'6 The appropriate place to
start is with the Court's final, and most overtly prudential, justification
for rejecting suspect class status for the mentally retarded. Recall that
the Court concluded its suspect class analysis by expressing concern
that a contrary holding would encourage a flood of other groups to
request similar status.'6 7 Extraordinarily, the Court described these
groups--consisting of at least "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill,
and the infirm"'' s in terms that seem to make them prime candidates
for suspect class status:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect ...it would be difficult ...to distinguish a
variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting
them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired
legislative responses, and who can69claim some degree of prejudice from
at least part of the public at large.
This passage gives pause. It suggests that satisfaction of the
standard criteria for suspect class status immutability, a history of
discrimination, and political powerlessness' 7 -- do not necessarily
mean that a court should holdthatthe group is in fact a suspect class. 7'
Unless the Court is implicitly abandoning those criteria (an
explanation unsupported elsewhere in the opinion or in the Court's
subsequent equal protection jurisprudence'72 ), the Court must have
believed that sometimes the negative prudential consequences of
granting suspect class status outweigh legal arguments in favor.
166. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
167. 1d at 445-46.
168. Id.at446.
169. Id.at 445.
170. See, e.g.,
id.
at 445-46 (discussing criteria for suspect class status).
171. It is worth noting that two of the groups so described-the aged and the
disabled-have been the subjects of Section 5 legislation that the Court has struck down in
recent years. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 383 (2001) (striking down part of the
Americans with Disabilities Act as inappropriate Section 5 legislation); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (reaching the same conclusion with regard to the ADEA).
172. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987) (using these criteria to
determine whether a group constitutes a suspect class); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986) (same).
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Obviously, one of those consequences feared by the Court was
the prospect that if the mentally retarded were granted suspect class
status, many other groups could make similar arguments for
heightened scrutiny. This "floodgates" concern is a legitimate one-at
least since the legal realists, it has been accepted that a court
formulating a legal rule must be aware of the rule's practical
implications as well as its formal logic. In this case, the potential
opening up of the floodgates to suspect class claims by a variety of
other groups would present the Court with a dilemma: either expand
greatly the judicial role in equal protection analysis, with all the
attendant implementation problems and concerns about judicial overreaching, or else attempt to distinguish between groups in ways that
would be criticized as unprincipled.'73 A line had to be drawn, the
Court seems to say. In Cleburne,it drew the line at the very beginning.
These concerns about overreaching and line-drawing are much
less salient for a legislature. As a political institution with a constantly
renewed democratic mandate, Congress is less susceptible to the
charge of imperialism.'74 The idea of self-limitation is at least formally
inapplicable to the body that represents the people, and whose powers,
within its proper sphere, are understood to be plenary. Congress's
democratic legitimacy also spares it from the requirement that it use
legal reasoning to justify the lines it draws. Thus, unlike the Court,
173. See, e.g., Washington v.Davis 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (noting the large number
of governmental decisions that would be subject to strict scrutiny under a disparate impact
standard).
174. Of course, Congress is sometimes criticized for over-legislating, that is,
legislating in areas that as matters of policy should be left to state and local governments,
even if such legislation is clearly within Congress's constitutional powers. It is also criticized
for encroaching on the constitutional prerogatives of other governmental entities, most
notably the executive branch and the states.
The first of these criticisms ultimately founders on the simple fact that if the polity
desires less federal regulation, it can vote in accordance with that wish. Past electoral events,
most notably the 1994 congressional elections that brought to power Republican leaders
committed to devolving authority onto the states, suggest that there is not an unceasingly
upward ratchet of federal regulation as compared with state autonomy.
The second criticism can be countered by observing that judicially imposed limits on
Congress's power have the potential to cabin Congress's power to usurp other branches'
constitutional authorit' The current Court has shown s.gnificant willingness'to impose such
limits on Congress, especially with regard to Congress's regulation of the states or usurpation
of state regulatory prerogatives. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1999);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); New York v. United States, 504 U.S. 144
(1992); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). As suggested later in the Article,
judicially enforceable limits on Congress's Section 5 power do exist. See infra Part III.B.
The important point for our purposes is that within those limits, Congress's power is plenary;
that is, it does not require principled justifications for when Congress regulates and when it
declines to.
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Congress can legitimately provide extra protection for, say, the
mentally retarded while denying it to the aged.
An analogue to the line-drawing problem appears in Katzenbach
v Morgan,one of the foundational Warren Court Section 5 cases.'75 In
Morgan, the Court upheld as a valid Section 5 enactment section 4(e)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which required states to grant voting
rights to Spanish speakers who had attained a sixth-grade education in
Spanish-language American-flag schools (essentially, schools in
Puerto Rico). 6 For present purposes, the interesting part of Morgan is
the Court's answer to the State's argument that section 4(e) itself
constituted invidious discrimination, by distinguishing between nonEnglish speakers with regard to the right to vote.'77 Justice Brennan's
response-that section 4(e) was "a reform measure"'78 and thus did not
call forth the strict scrutiny required when a statute denied rightsmoves toward the same understanding put forward in this Article about
legislatures' superior capacity for line-drawing.'79 His response relies

on his conclusion, earlier in the Morgan opinion, that the Section 5
power is plenary, and thus provides the legislature with broad authority
to pick and choose the problems that call most urgently for legislative
While Morgan's description of the Section 5 power as
correction.'
plenary is usually cited as authority for Congress to go beyond the
constitutional rule enunciated by the Court,'8 ' it also supports his
deference toward Congress's decision notto go farther than it did, that
is, to draw lines between groups that receive a benefit and those that do
not.
Justice Brennan's task in answering the state's argument was
especially challenging because section 4(e) dealt with a judicially
declared fundamental right, 2 where the availability of judicially
cognizable sources of meaning might have warranted higher judicial
175. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
176. See id. at 648.
177. Seeid at656.
178.

Id. at 657.

179. Indeed, that answer cited the familiar rational-basis standard concept that
legislatures could attack problems "one step at a time." See id
180. Seeid at 655-56.
181. See, e.g., Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?'" The Sources and Limits of
FederalCourt and CongressionalJurisdiction Over Matteis "TouchingReligion" 29 IND. L.

REv. 1, 80 (1995); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique,
Morrison, and the Future ofFederalAntidiscirmnationLaw, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 109, 118-19;
Hayward D. Reynolds, Deconstructing State Action: The Politics of State Action, 20 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 847, 905 (1994).
182. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
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scrutiny. In other words, the State in Morgan could reasonably have
argued that congressional line-drawing is especially questionable
when, as in section 4(e), the differential treatment concerned a
fundamental right such as voting. By contrast, when, as in Clebume,
the issue is purely whether legislation burdening a group should get
higher scrutiny without any fundamental right at stake, the
constitutional question reduces to whether judicially cognizable differences, explainable in the language of legal doctrine, exist between
groups that justify granting suspect class status to one group but not
another. As the Court in Clebune suggested in its "floodgates" paragraph, judicially accessible reasoning may not be available to
distinguish between, in that case, the mentally retarded on one side and
the aged, the disabled, and the infirm on the other. ' In turn, that lack
of reasoning might lead the Court to err on the side of protecting none
of those groups. But Congress, as long as it remains within the scope
of power Section 5 grants it (a big if, examined below184), need not
make such all-or-nothing decisions.
Institutional competence also helps explain another justification
the Cleburne Court offered for denying suspect class status to the
mentally retarded. In the paragraph immediately following the one
quoted above,' 5 it stated:
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be instances of
discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious, and that
are properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms.
But the appropriate method of reaching such instances is not to create a
new quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action
based on that classification to more searching evaluation. Rather, we
should look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on a
particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the
specifics of the case before us. Because mental retardation is a
characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in
a wide range of decisions, and because both State and Federal
Governments have recently committed themselves to assisting the
retarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action, even one
that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that
'
the Constitution will not tolerate. 86

183.
184.
185.
186.

See City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,446(1985).
Seemh a Part II.E.
See supm text accompanying note 169.
Cleburne,473 U.S. at 446.
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In essence, the Court concludes here that heightened scrutiny is too
blunt a tool to apply to classifications based on mental retardation,
where instances of unconstitutional conduct are mixed in with mainly
legitimate government action.
So understood, the Court again indicates a concern with linedrawing. Unlike the concern noted above, though, in which linedrawing concerned different groups seeking suspect class status, this
latter concern can be described as on a micro level, namely, between
particular legitimate and illegitimate burdens imposed on a given
group. This type of line-drawing problem implicates a different competence concern. Here, the Court faces a classification criterion,
mental retardation, that is mainly legitimate, but can be misused (as the
Court held it was in Cleburne itself). The fact that most uses of the
criterion are legitimate deprives the Court of strict scrutiny, its most
useful tool in determining equal protection violations, much like the
presence of significant numbers of civilians in a combat area deprives
a humane military force of the option of using its most indiscriminate
weapons. Thus, the Court must go in on foot, parsing good from bad
classifications as they arise, much like an army in this situation must
go house to house.
Congress is better situated than courts to engage in this
particularized sifting, because Congress can mold a Section 5 statute
to address what are perceived to be the most serious threats of
unconstitutional conduct. A statute can provide a detailed set of regulations for one subject area and a different set for another, while
leaving a third area largely untouched, all based on perceived constitutional concerns. In the context of mental retardation, for example,
Congress could impose more intrusive requirements with regard to
zoning laws, which it might perceive as especially susceptible to
animus-based manipulation based on residents' unreasonable fears of
retarded individuals, and less intrusive requirements, or none at all,
with regard to education, if it appears that states can be trusted to do
the right thing, or if the "right thing" is a matter of honest disagreement among professionals. In short, the flexibility inherent in
legislative action allows Congress to more effectively detect and
remedy the merely occasional equal protection violations that burden
most groups in society.
Judicial decisionmaking does not allow for this flexibility. A
court considering a rational basis challenge to a government action
tests the facts against the single, broad legal principle that government
action may not be based on animus or, as in Allegheny, on some
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extreme level of irrationality. Thus, a court's decision striking down a

government action as lacking a rational basis is almost necessarily
particularistic. Under standard doctrine, that decision means that
every legitimate explanation for the challenged action has been
considered and found wanting, revealing an unusual, almost
idiosyncratically foolish or mean-spirited government action. 87 Such a
decision sends a decidedly mixed message to lower courts. On the one
hand, the action struck down is condemned as severely irrational or
mean-spirited, while on the other hand, the court's focus is necessarily
so particularized that the precedential impact of that decision is
presumably quite narrow.'88 This problem is compounded by the fact

that judicial review yields an all-or-nothing result-an affirmance or a
strike down. These characteristics of rational basis review make it less
of an effective guard against unthinking or animus-based action, and
more an arbitrary lightning bolt that, when effective at all, completely
wipes out one action but leaves similarly problematic conduct
untouched. Congress, with the flexibility inherent in legislation, can

craft a result that is at once broader, in the sense of applying to a
general species of potentially problematic government action, and
more nuanced, in the sense of imposing rules that fall between
complete approval and outright prohibition.
C

Congress Versus State Legislatures

Up to this point, most of the institutional argument in favor of
Congress could apply just as easily to state legislatures. This Article
has occasionally referred to characteristics of Congress that distinguish
it from state legislatures-most notably, Congress's nationwide
187. One is reminded here of Tolstoy's words in Anna Karenina. "happy families are
all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3
(Constance Garnett trans., Barnes & Noble Books 1997) (1878). My attention was called to
this quote by a work by Laurence Tribe. See Laurence Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy. Does the
Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-OrReveal the Structure ofthe Present,
113 HAv. L. REV. 110, 110 (1999) (paraphrasing Tolstoy).
188. Such a decision might serve as a signal to other courts that the burdened group
should not be considered a per se loser in any equal protection claim. In that sense, the
victory, for example by the retarded in Cleburne, could be seen as informal precedent that
retardation classifications should be examined with some care. Moreover, such a decision
might be cited as support for a subsequent grant of suspect-class status, on the ground that the
earlier decision was in effect an example of that group receiving heightened scrutiny. This is,
for example, a common explanation of the evolution of gender as a suspect class. In
Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973), Justice Brennan's plurality based its
argument for heightened scrutiny for gender classifications in part on the fact that in Reed v
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971), the Court had in fact already started scrutinizing such
classifications more carefully.
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representativeness-but for the most part the claims made above could
apply almost as easily to a state legislature. This conclusion is
troubling for any argument about the scope of the Section 5 power,
because that power is aimed explicitly at states, and largely at state
legislatures. Is there anything particular about Congress that justifies
giving it a superintending power over state legislatures?
One obvious answer to this question rests on the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress is different from state legislatures,
this argument goes, because the Amendment says so. The Fourteenth
Amendment limits states' prerogatives, and Section 5 accords an
enforcement role, however defined, to Congress. This textual argument
is buttressed by the undeniable fact that, whatever else the Drafters
intended, they clearly meant to impose some federal constitutional
limits, based on a basic principle of equality, on how states could treat
individuals. These textual and historical arguments are necessary to
understanding Congress's power under Section 5. Nevertheless, they
do not relate to any unique institutional competence Congress may
enjoy over state legislatures.
Still, institutional differences between Congress and state
legislatures do exist, and have been recognized since 1787. Most
notably, Madison's theory of faction rests on a belief that smaller
republics were more prone to private-regarding, factional politics, the
kind of politics that produces exactly the kind of animus that is one of
the few solid rules emanating from the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence.189 Put another way, Congress's national scope ensures
that, as between Congress and state legislatures, the former is best able
to make determinations about the reasonableness of government
classifications.
This institutional argument must not be overread. Madison's
theory of factions is justly praised for its insight and explanatory
power,19 but using it to justify congressional power to override any
state classification decision would surely place on it more weight than
it can bear. There must be some external limits on that power, unless
we are to conclude that the Drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment

SeeTttEFEDERALISTNo. 10 (James Madison).
190. See generally,e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madisons Vision of the
State: A Public ChoicePerspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1330 (1994). For an innovative
modem application of Madison's theory, see Alexandra Natapoff, Madisonian
Multiculturalism, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 751, 752-56 (1996) (applying Madison's theory to
critique the Supreme Court's insistence on race-blind government action).
189.
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intended to place in Congress a general veto power over any state
legislation that classifies.
Ultimately, federalism-based limits on Section 5 do not derive
mainly from functional considerations themselves, but from one of the
relatively few solid rules of law that has emerged from courts'
experience with the Equal Protection Clause. That rule, alluded to
throughout this Article, but the specific focus of the next subsection, is
the rule against animus.
D.

TheAntianimusRule and the "Enforcement"ofEqualProtection

The antianimus rule goes a long way toward integrating the
Court's approach to equal protection with a richer understanding of the
Section 5 power. That rule is in fact an interpretation of the equal
protection guarantee, as opposed to a mere mechanism for deciding
cases. The Court's interpretation of the Clause as enshrining a rule
against all arbitrary classifications-that is, all classifications enacted
simply to burden one group relative to another--constitutes a meaningful statement of law, and a reflection of judicial supremacy in the
law-declaring function. Such a rule has strong historical support in the
antebellum ideas of equality and nonarbitrariness that were clearly on
the minds of the Fourteenth Amendment's Drafters."'
An understanding of equal protection as fundamentally a rule
against animus allocates a significant role for Congress in marshaling
its capabilities to give that rule life in concrete circumstances.
Especially suited to congressional action are situations where detecting
animus requires either significant findings of policy-type facts or
finely tuned judgments about the social meaning accorded particular
classifications, or where combating animus requires restructuring of
social institutions. 92
This suggestion of broader congressional competence does not
trivialize the Court's law-declaring power. The antianimus rule was the
product of judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause,
interpretations that rejected both broader and narrower views of the

191.

See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 45, at 19-99; WILL"AM E.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:

NELSON, THE
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE To JUDIcIAL DOCTRINE 64 (1988)

("Both in the debates in Congress during which the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and
in the ratification debates in the states, proponents of section one ... referred to the same
libertarian and egalitarian principles that they had commonly used during the three previous
decades.").
192. SeeAraiza, supmrnote 110, at 223.
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Clause.193 By rejecting other possible understandings of equal protection, the courts have stated authoritatively its meaning as a rule
against animus. Such a statement reflects the Marbury v Madison
power "to say what the law is,"'9' and thus demonstrates the continued
importance of the judicial role, not just in deciding cases under the
Equal Protection Clause, but also in explaining what it ultimately
means.
Another such statement of what the Clause actually means
appears when the Court determines that a particular classification tool,
most notably race, is presumed unreasonable. As argued earlier, the
application of strict scrutiny to a classification such as race reflects the
Court's confidence that the classifying criterion serves no legitimate
purpose.9 In such cases, the Court applies the device of strict scrutiny
to give concrete meaning to the antianimus rule.'96 In those cases, the
Court's analysis constitutes a direct interpretation of the equal
protection guarantee, not an interpretation mediated through the filter
of deferential review. That analysis should enjoy the status of a true
judicial interpretation of the law, immune from congressional secondguessing (although still amenable to congressional protectionl").
This analysis in turn presents a new perspective on the Court's
declaration in Morgan that the Section 5 power is a one-way ratchet,
authorizing expansions but not dilutions of court-found Fourteenth
Amendment rights.'98 Subsequent commentators, as well as Justice
Harlan dissenting in Morgan itself, have criticized the ratchet concept
193. The Clause could have been interpreted to protect only African-Americans, or
even only ex-slaves. It could have been interpreted to ensure only that a law had to be applied
equally to everyone to whom it applied, even if the law itself was facially discriminatory, or to
apply only to a limited set of rights, such as those understood in the nineteenth century as
"civil" rather than "political" or "social." The Clause could have been interpreted to deal not
with classifications generally, but with the protection of groups. None of these paths was
taken, or at least none enjoys judicial acceptance today. The Clause applies to all
governmental classifications, from race-based decisionmaking to classifications based on
membership in one economic interest group as opposed to another, regardless of whether the
classification is with regard to provision of a right, only to intentional classifications, and to
individuals as opposed to groups. The strong historical basis for the antianimus rule and its
acceptance by the courts justify bestowing on it the status of constitutional rule rather than
mere decisional aid.
194. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
195. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (noting that strict scrutiny of racial set-asides is necessary in order to
distinguish between benign race classifications and ideas of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics).
197. See infia Part II.B.
198. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n. 10 (1966).
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as unprincipled.'99 However if decisions striking down laws on equal
protection grounds are understood as instances in which courts are
sufficiently confident in their ability to uncover extreme irrationality or
animus, then they can be seen as first-order interpretations of equal
protection, that is, instances of judicially supreme constitutional
interpretation not subject to congressional override. Justice Brennan
made a similar point in Oregon v Mitchell, where, defending his
ratchet theory, he said the following:
a decision of this Court striking down a state statute expresses, among
other things, our conclusion that the legislative findings upon which the
statute is based are so far wrong as to be unreasonable. Unless
Congress were to unearth new evidence in its investigation, its identical
findings on the identical issue would be no more reasonable than those
of the state legislature.2"
While Justice Brennan uses the language of fact-findings, he
makes the same point set forth above-namely, that a decision striking
down a law reflects judicial confidence in its ability to perceive
unconstitutional conduct. In Justice Brennan's language, the state's
facts "are so far wrong as to be unreasonable,"2 ' while the theory
sketched above speaks of government actions that are so clearly not
aimed at a legitimate purpose as to justify a holding that the action was
either irrational or motivated by animus. Under either formulation, a
court's confidence in the correctness of its judgment precludes
congressional action to override it, either because that congressional
override would reflect the same implausible facts, or because the
judicial decision reflects a true judicial application of the Equal
Protection Clause, worthy of judicial supremacy, not simply application of a decisional device that is not itself the Clause."'
199.

See id at 659, 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposingof

the Red Hemings." A Defense ofthe Religious Freedom RestorationAc4 69 S.CAL. L. REV.
589, 697 n.438 (1996) (citing critiques and defenses of the ratchet theory).
200. 400 U.S. 112,249 n.31 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. Id.

202. But what if Congress or the state legislature does in fact come up with new
evidence supporting facts found unreasonable by the Court? This issue may well be decided
in the litigation over the new federal partial birth abortion statute. Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1531).

In that statute, the Court, presumably in order to avoid the effect of the Court's strike down of
a similar abortion restriction in 2000, see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000),
purported to find, as a fact, that the prohibited abortion procedure was never medically
necessary. See Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2. Such a fact, if accepted, would impact the
constitutionality of the law, given the current doctrine's concern with ensuring that women
always have the ultimate choice, previability, to undergo an abortion in a way that would be
safest for her. The new federal abortion statute affects substantive due process fights rather
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If the Court's equal protection cases are understood based on the
foregoing, then the congruence and proportionality concept, like the
concept of judicial interpretive supremacy, remains a reasonable
formula for testing Section 5 legislation. Under this Article's
approach, congressional action must still be congruent and proportional to the underlying constitutional violations the Court has
identified. What would be different are the conclusions about which
judicial decisions reflect true constitutional interpretation, and which
reflect prudential decisionmaking by the Court. True constitutional
interpretation would be limited first, to the overall rule that
government classifications not be so unreasonable as to be arbitrary;
second, to particular decisions that certain classifications fail that test;
and third, to the rule that race classifications should be reviewed with
at least some skepticism.
It might be thought that this analysis results, ironically, in giving
Congress more latitude to legislate with regard to nonsuspect classes,
on the ground that in those situations the Court had confessed the sort
of institutional incompetence described above, and less leeway to
legislate with regard to suspect classes, especially race, where the
Court is more confident of its own ability to determine what equal
protection requires. This intuition is correct, but is only half the story.
The foregoing analysis identifies two sources of Congress's powers to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause. The first is the familiar one of
enforcing, through congruent and proportional means, against
classifications such as race that courts have identified as running a
high risk of arbitrariness. Thus, results like that in Morgan would
remain good law on the theory that the Court had identified a
particular rule-that people should enjoy equal attention from government, regardless of their race or ethnicity-and Congress was simply
enforcing that rule through a congruent and proportional statute.2"3
The second basis for congressional power involves Congress
enforcing, again through congruent and proportional means, the
underlying judicial rule against arbitrary classifications, with the
than equal protection rights. It may be that Congress has less latitude to find facts impacting
the former as compared with the latter, on the theory that equal protection issues are more
appropriately left to Congress than due process issues, given the more judicially accessible
nature of due process analysis. But the litigation about the abortion law may nevertheless
illuminate the Court's attitude toward subsequent congressional fact-finding regarding
matters of constitutional fights that contradicts facts found by courts.
203. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997) (discussing Morganand
describing section 4(e) as "a remedial measure to deal with discrimination in governmental
services") (internal quotation omitted)).
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understanding that 'in many cases -courts themselves cannot identify
every instance where such arbitrariness exists. This second approach
is the one on which this Article has focused. But it is not inconsistent
with the first. Indeed, it fits snugly next to it, as in both cases the
operative inquiry asks whether Congress, using its unique institutional
capacities, has appropriately applied the constitutional rule the Court
has enunciated.
E.

The Implications-andCabiningThem

At first blush, this analysis appears to carry extraordinarily broad
implications. If legislatures have the leeway to determine what constitutes reasonable classifications when the Court, by adopting the
rational basis standard, confesses its inability to do so, and if Section 5
gives Congress the authority to supervise the states in their own
determinations on this issue, then Section 5 has become a powerful
tool indeed. Because the rational basis standard applies to a breathtakingly broad array of modern legislation-indeed, to all legislation
that classifies, with the exception of legislation that affects suspect
classes or impacts fundamental rights--Congress's power to determine
the reasonableness of classifications would give it the authority to
police states' classification choices across this variety of regulatory
fields, all under the rubric of ensuring that states not engage in
invidious classifications. Section 5 would give Congress the power to
forbid states from discriminating against, or in favor of, recent
property purchasers as opposed to long-time owners,2" relatives of
riverboat captains as opposed to all other applicants for riverboat
captain positions,"5 or truck owners who place their own advertising
on the sides of their vehicles, as opposed to owners who rent out the
sides of their trucks to others." 6
But this fear of overly broad congressional power turns out to be
unwarranted. Recall that this problem seemingly arises because the
judicial rule in rational basis cases is seemingly that there is no rulecourts' incompetence to determine the reasonableness of most
classifications means that they will uphold almost any legislative linedrawing. But there is court-made law here, and it adequately cabins
Congress's Section 5 power. To repeat, the judicial rule for equal protection asks whether there is a reasonable relation between the statute
204.
205.
206.

SeeNordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,4 (1992).
See Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 563-64 (1947).
See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 108 (1949).
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and a legitimate government interest. This formula makes clear that
animus is not allowed; in the Court's words, "a bare... desire to harm
a politically unpopular group" 27 can never justify a classification.
Thus, in ensuring that states' classifications are reasonable, it may be
appropriate to limit Congress to guarding against animus. In brief, the
judicial rule is "no animus," and Congress's role in enforcing that rule
is to determine when state classifications fail that test.
Does this rule provide any limit on the kind of legislation
Congress could enact under its Section 5 power? What about the
examples offered above? 2" This Article argues that an antianimus rule
does in fact limit Congress, because animus is unlikely in many
situations covered by the rational basis standard. Recall that under
standard equal protection doctrine, rational basis is used when, among
other things, the burdened group is held to not be characterized by an
immutable characteristic, and not to have suffered a history of
discrimination or to lack currently significant political power. Thus,
the quintessential nonsuspect class is a group marked by its conduct
rather than its immutable status, which has not suffered systemic
exclusion from the political process, either historically or currently.
Such groups may lose political battles, and thus be subject to
unfavorable legislation, but it is unlikely that such losses could be
described as motivated "by a bare ...desire to harm" that group.0"

Thus, recent purchasers of property, nonrelatives of current riverboat
captains, and truck owners who rent their trucks out for advertising
would all seem to be unlikely victims of animus, and thus beyond the
reach of Congress's Section 5 power.210
On the other hand, the mentally retarded, gays and lesbians, outof-staters, the disabled, and others might find themselves at some time
or another the victims of such animus. They may not be the victims of
animus all the time. For example, the mentally retarded or physically
disabled may be burdened because a state government decisionmaker
sincerely believes, after carefully considering the issue, that differential
treatment may be in their best interest. Out-of-staters may be burdened
because of a mere desire to foist costs onto them, or to keep a state's
resources for its own citizens, or they may be burdened in a legitimate
effort by a state to keep for its citizens a resource for which those

207.
208.
209.
210.

SeeU.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
See supra text accompanying notes 204-206.
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citizens have paid."' As discussed -at length earlier in this Article, the
Cleburne Court's refusal to grant suspect class status to the mentally
retarded can be understood as reflecting a belief that classifications
involving the mentally retarded may sometimes be reasonable, and
other times reflect animus, and that telling the two apart may simply be
too difficult a task for the court, and one that is not advanced by a tool
as blunt as across-the-board heightened scrutiny. Animus against the
group is still possible, however, as the Court itself concluded when it
struck down the zoning decision."2 This Article suggests that
Congress should also have authority to determine when animus
motivates actions burdening nonsuspect groups.
Indeed, understanding Clebume's suspect class discussion in this
way-as a recognition that there may sometimes be animus against a
group like the mentally retarded, but that such animus has to be
detected by a court on a case-by-case basis-supports a conception of
Congress's Section 5 power in which Congress's task is to help the
Court detect and counteract such animus. Because Congress is better
than courts at determining social meaning, can detect when politicians
may be under pressure to act based on constituent fear, and can attack
problems in a more nuanced way than courts, it is this kind of task for
which Congress is exactly suited. The "no aninms" limitation on
Congress's Section 5 power, then, turns out to be not an unprincipled
line drawn simply to prevent Section 5 from becoming an all-purpose
congressional check on state government. Instead, it fits quite consistently within the overall institutional competence thrust of this Article's
thesis.
211. Compare, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,453 (1973) (upholding differential
in- and out-of-state college tuition), with Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (striking

down an Alaska oil-royalty share scheme that favored longer-time residents over new
arrivals). See also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (distinguishing welfare benefits,
which are consumed within a state and which the state thus does not have a right to limit to
bona fide new residents, from state-subsidized college educations, which are "portable" and

thus for which the state has a legitimate interest in charging out-of-staters more).
The one example noted in the text but not discussed is homosexuals. There is a real
question of whether discrimination against homosexuals can ever be rational, as least as long
as the only justification offered in defense of the classification is the moral beliefs of the
community, or fear of community disruption if gays are granted a particular benefit on equal
terms with heterosexuals. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts: Section 5 of
the FourteenthAmendment andthe Availability of DamagesAwards to Gay State Employees
Under the ProposedEmployment Non-DiscriminationAct, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 2937 (2002); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (questioning the

sufficiency of moral disapproval as a ground for legislative restrictions on conduct). This
Article does not deal with that question.
212.

See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)

(concluding that the government's action was motivated by animus).
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This analysis is generally consistent with the Court's current
"congruence and proportionality" test. Both approaches seek to tie the
Section 5 power to the judicially declared meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The difference lies in the identification of the unconstitutional action against which Congress is allowed to guard. Under this
Article's approach, a court's Section 5 inquiry would recognize that
courts have a difficult time uncovering animus in the context of
nonsuspect classes, but would also acknowledge that such animus still
exists, and that in many circumstances Congress is better suited to
identify it. So understood, this approach is simply another way of
arguing for greater judicial deference to congressional determinations
of unconstitutional conduct, a proposal made frequently by commentators critiquing the Court's recent Section 5 decisions." 3 This proposal
differs, though, in that it seeks to solve the Marburyproblem, that is,
the problem posed when a Section 5 statute is thought to redefine the
Constitution by banning conduct the Court has upheld under the
rational basis standard.
It seeks to resolve that problem by
reconceptualizing the rational basis standard, decoupling it from the
Constitution itself, and explaining it as merely a decisional tool that
does not itself represent an interpretation of the Constitution which
Congress must respect.
Determining whether Congress was acting to prohibit animusbased actions by state government would present a difficult task for a
court considering a challenge to a Section 5 statute. Under current
doctrine, much of this difficulty is elided by the Court's embrace of the
fiction that the rational basis standard means that governmental action
reviewed under it is almost always constitutional in some abstract
sense. Thus, the current Court, when reviewing a Section 5 statute
assisting a nonsuspect class, distorts the analysis by requiring that the
statute be justified as a remedy for a very small constitutional wrong.
In turn, this requirement demands a very precisely tailored statute,
because only a precisely tailored statute can be a congruent and
proportional response to a trivial constitutional problem.2 4 This
213. See, e.g., sources cited supm note 22.
214. The other way of upholding a Section 5 statute aimed at a nonsuspect class is for
Congress to supply sufficient facts to convince the Court that the constitutional wrong
targeted by the statute is in fact more widespread than the Court had realized. In Board of
Trustees v Garrett,the leading Section 5 case considering this possibility, the Court required
that that evidence itself be precisely targeted at proving this wider scope of constitutional
violations. 531 U.S. 356, 368-72 (2001) (requiring that the evidence pertain to states, not
counties or other parties not subject to the Eleventh Amendment; be relatively widespread;
and be of the type to suggest liability had the victim sued in a court). The correctness of
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doctrinal structure makes it relatively easy for the Court to find some
overbreadth in the statute; which thus causes the statute to fail the
congruence and proportionality test."'
By contrast, the approach suggested in this Article requires a
court to be more nuanced when it identifies the constitutional wrong at
which the statute is targeted. Under this approach, a court performing
a congruence and proportionality analysis would start by acknowledging that the benefited group's status as a nonsuspect class means
only that courts have not been able to state authoritatively whether
discrimination against the group is often invidious. At this first stage
of the analysis, where it reviews its own pronouncements about the
status of that group, the court would have to keep an open mind on the
question whether the challenged statute constitutes an attempt to deal
with animus that a court may not have recognized, or alternatively
whether it represents an illegitimate attempt by Congress to go beyond
the judicially announced meaning of equal protection.
In answering that key question the court should be able to employ
certain decisionmaking tools. 16 First, have courts themselves recognized that the relevant group has been the victim of animus? If so, as
in the case of the mentally retarded,"7 homosexuals," 8 and participants
in unconventional living arrangements,29 then the Court should be
more willing to accept Congress's determination. Second, standard
suspect class criteria remain useful. Even if, by hypothesis, considerations of immutability, political powerlessness, and historical discrimination do not require labeling a classification criterion as suspect, the
existence of one or more of these criteria lends credence to a
Garirffs approach to the fact-finding issue is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses
instead on the characterization of the constitutional wrong, rather than on whether the wrong
is, as an empirical matter, more widespread than the Court had previously understood.
215. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) ("Judged against
the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. The Act, through its broad
restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state
employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.' (internal quotation and citation
omitted)).
216. Use of decisional tools is not inappropriate in this context because the ultimate
question is not what the Constitution requires, but rather whether Congress has kept close
enough to the constitutional line as to satisfy the requirement of congruence and
proportionality.
217. See Cleburne,473 U.S. at 432.
218. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
219. SeeU.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
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conclusion that the particular conduct regulated by the Section 5
statute resulted from animus. Recall the "floodgates" analysis in
Clebume, where the Court implicitly recognized the Caroleno-based
argument in favor of suspect class status for the mentally retarded, but
stepped back from bestowing that status because of a line-drawing
concern."0 Understanding the rational basis standard as a response to
such prudential concerns provides increased flexibility for Congress, a
body better suited to draw such lines, while avoiding any formal
inconsistency between judicial use of the rational basis standard for
that group and deferential judicial review of a Section 5 statute
benefiting it.
The statute's characteristics themselves should also be relevant to
a court's Section 5 analysis. For example, the statute's breadth should
matter, just as it does under current "congruence and proportionality"
analysis.22 ' A group's failure to satisfy the Court's criteria for suspect
class status indicates that the group is not prone to across-the-board,
systematic denials of political access. Accordingly, an across-theboard statute benefiting those groups might be thought to exceed
Congress's authority, by outrunning the extent to which the benefited
group likely suffered from animus. It would also be appropriate for a
court to consider whether the statute dealt with particular subject areas
(for example, education or access to public benefits) where courts had
already considered states to have acted unconstitutionally2"
220. See Cleburne,473 U.S. at 445-46 (conceding that the mentally retarded may have
satisfied these criteria but nevertheless concluding for prudential reasons not to designate that
group a suspect class).
221. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86-89 (2000) (discussing the
breadth of the ADEA).
222. Denial of public assistance benefits and education based on status distinctions
might be an example where a court could justifiably give broader room for congressional
action. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 530 (status of being legally related to other members
comprising the household seeking benefits); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-25 (2002)
(status of being an illegal alien minor). The benefits cut-off in Moreno was required by
federal law, which might raise the objection that a history of troubling federalpracticeshould
not justify judicial deference when Congress itself imposes restrictions on state governments.
But again, if deference is due, it is not limited to situations where Congress found evidence
that would convince a court-here, for example, evidence that state governments had acted.
Such a limitation might be appropriate were a court, absent a Section 5 statute, to consider
whether a state's benefits classification violated equal protection. But deference to Congress
must mean deference to the kinds of evidence that Congress might consider relevant. In this
case, for example, that evidence might include its own history of mean-spirited deprivations
of public benefits. Similarly, a Section 5 statute restricting states' ability to draw racial or
ethnic lines might profitably draw on Congress's suspicions of all government action based
on race, a suspicion that Congress would have a right to have based on racist federal actions,
such as the Japanese-American internments during World War II. See Civil Liberties Act of
1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4 (1988) (providing compensation for Japanese-Americans
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Of course, the institutional factors discussed earlier are also
relevant to the Section 5 inquiry.223 Thus, to the extent that a statute
reflects congressional fact-finding of the sort discussed above,224 or
draws lines of the sort not amenable to judicial reasoning,"' or reflects
Congress's better grasp of the realities of governing and of politics,226
the statute should stand on stronger constitutional ground when
challenged in the courts.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the issue of the overall
appropriate level of deference to Congress in a Section 5 inquiry.
Several of the criteria offered above for the Court's Section 5 inquiry
are similar to those employed in current Section 5 analysis. Whether
this Article's proposal really changes the analysis would depend on the
level of deference the Court accords legislative determinations. This
Article argues that a proper understanding of the rational basis
standard impacts the appropriate level of deference that courts should
accord Section 5 statutes. For example, under current Section 5
jurisprudence, a statute like the Americans with Disabilities Act faced
a high hurdle as a Section 5 enactment, because it benefits a group that
the Court considers, under its (mis)understanding of the rational basis
standard, to almost never be the victim of unconstitutional
discrimination."7 Under the suggested approach, that presumption
would not be as strong. Instead, the Court would understand its application of the rational basis standard less as a statement of its
confidence that the group in question is almost never the victim of
unconstitutional action, and more as a confession of courts' inability to
Such a confession
evaluate classifications regarding that group.
naturally implies a greater degree of deference to Congress, because
now the statute does not directly contradict court-made equal
protection law, but rather supplements a court's self-confessed inability
fully to declare that law. This extra degree of deference cannot be
pinpointed with any precision. Nor is it unlimited. Here, though, the
interned during World War II); see alsoAraiza, supranote 110, at 230 (discussing the broader
scope of evidence that Congress should be able to consider in determining whether state
conduct runs a high risk of violating equal protection).
223. See supra rsrt II.A.
224. See supa Part II.A.4.
225. See supa Part 11.A.2.
226. See supa Part 11.A.
227. See supra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
228. Recall that in Cleburne,the Court specifically mentioned the disabled as a group
that might well deserve heightened scrutiny, if not for the prudential-based concern about
opening the floodgates to other groups' claims. See 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985); see also
supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
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criteria offered earlier play a role in cabining that deference around the
judicially announced antianimus rule.
III.

SECTION

5 BEYOND RATIONAL BASIS

The foregoing analysis has implications that go beyond situations
where judicial review is governed by the rational basis standard. This
analysis focused on that standard because it provides relatively clear
insights about what a court does when it decides equal protection
cases, which in turn reveals the contours of true equal protection "law"
that mark the proper limits of Congress's Section 5 authority. This
analysis should be amenable to considerations of Congress's authority
to enforce the equal protection guarantee in situations where judicial
review goes beyond rational basis. This Article now briefly speculates
as to the Section 5 power in those situations. Fuller treatment of these
issues, however, must await another occasion.
A.

Gender

In many ways, gender presents the most interesting application of
this conception of the Section 5 power. Gender is especially
interesting because of the nature of the Court's own view of gender
classifications. At its most simplistic, scrutiny of gender classifications falls somewhere in the middle of the two dimensional scale
bounded on one end by rational basis and on the other by strict
scrutiny. Thus, the Court has concluded that, despite the general
irrelevance of the gender characteristic, gender does matter in some
situations. This conclusion renders gender different from race, even
after the United States v Virginia Court applied what seemed to be
quite strict scrutiny to the gender classification in that case.229 In fact,
the Virginia Court itself expressly approved, at least in principle,
gender lines drawn in order to compensate women for past
and to ensure equal social and economic status for
discrimination
3
women:

0

The Court's statements and actions in Virginia suggest a nuanced
approach to gender that is far more complex than simply a mid-range
position between the extremes of a two-dimensional scale. Instead, the
Court's approach, both in Virgai and other cases, examines the
229. 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (upholding
a gender classification based on the Court's conclusion that the classification tracked real
gender differences).
230. Sce518 U.S. at 533.
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rationale for and the context of a challenged gender line, in order to
determine whether it is truly compensatory or reflective of real
differences or, conversely, an inappropriate stereotype. In applying this
approach, the Court has sometimes attempted to make this
determination itself,"' while at other times it has examined a
legislature's motivations, with the aim of determining whether it made
a good-faith, informed judgment that conditions existed justifying
differential treatment. 2 In engaging in that motivational inquiry, the
Court's gender cases have considered the historical background of the
challenged classification 3 and the degree of deliberation with which
the governmental body acted.3
This nuanced, contextualized approach to gender inevitably
makes for a jurisprudence that is sometimes hard to understand: the
Court's ringing statements in Vigina about the "exceedingly
persuasive justification" needed for gender classifications and its
application of an extremely tight ends-means analysis were followed
five years later in Nguyen by a much more deferential approach.23 ' For
our purposes, the significance of this nuanced approach lay in the
authority it should rightly provide Congress, via its Section 5 power.
In particular, if a court has upheld a particular gender line as consistent
with equal protection, that decision should not necessarily be
considered equal protection "law" to the extent it relied on an inability
to discern inappropriate legislative motivation or an inability to
determine whether real, relevant gender differences existed.
Consider, for example, Michael M v Superior Cout, in which
the Court upheld a California statutory rape law that burdened males
231. See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64-68 (concluding that a mother's necessary
presence at birth makes it more likely that she, rather than the father, will have an opportunity
to develop a relationship with the child); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976)
(casting doubt on the reliability of statistics indicating a difference in dangerousness between
female and male drunk driving based on the possible biases of the law enforcement officers
whose actions constitute the data points for the statistics).
232. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 538-40 (examining the history of Virginia's
provision of higher education to women to test the credibility of the state's claim that its
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute was based on a desire to provide a
diverse menu of educational opportunities for its citizens); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,
72 (1981) (examining the care and deliberation with which Congress decided to exclude
women from draft registration).
233. See, e.g., Virgiua,518 U.S. at 538-40.
234. See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. at 73-78 (noting the care with which Congress
considered whether it was appropriate to require women to register for the draft).
235. The difference in tone between these cases becomes all the more striking when it
is realized that the composition of the Court had not changed between them, and that three
justices that had joined in the majority opinion or result in Viginia also joined the majority
opinion in Nguyen.
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more than females. 2" The Court upheld this law, with the plurality
reasoning that it might have been motivated by a real gender
difference-namely, the fact that only females can get pregnantwhich allocated the risks of sexual activity differently, thus justifying
California's attempt to equalize the risk.237 Justice Brennan dissented,
arguing in part that the real reason for the statute was a now-outdated
view of young women as fragile beings, incapable of giving true
consent, whose sexual purity needed to be protected."8 One way to
evaluate this disagreement is to say that courts are simply bad at
determining a legislature's intent, and that therefore they should give
the legislature the benefit of the doubt, at least when the issue does not
turn on race. Indeed, this seems to have been the plurality's approach
to the intent question. 39 However, there is less reason for Congress to
give state legislatures the benefit of the doubt. If "intent" in a case like
Michael M is considered broadly to stand for the social meaning
accorded a given legislative decision, then, as argued above, 4 ' there is
good reason to give Congress more leeway than courts in evaluating
the social meaning accorded statutes like California's.
Thus, if the question in gender cases is whether the state has
perpetuated an archaic, demeaning stereotype of women, then
Congress may well have something to add to a court's determination
on that issue. As with rational basis review, this is not to suggest that
courts have no role: a decision by a court that the state's action is in
fact motivated by such a stereotype241 would still be equal protection
"law," at least with regard to that particular government action. But
presumably many cases arise in which courts simply cannot be sure
what motivated the government.242 In cases like those, a court, as in

236. 450 U.S. 464,475 (1981) (plurality opinion).
237. See id at 470-73.
238. See id at 494-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
239. See id at 469-70 (plurality opinion).
240. See supm notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 n. 14 (1976).
242. On this point it suffices merely to note the federal government's recent move to
allow local schools to introduce more single-gender education, a decision that could
reasonably be characterized as troubling retrogression in the fight for gender equality, or an
appropriate concession to the very real empirical possibility that girls and boys learn
differently and would benefit from gender-specific pedagogy. See George Archibald, OneSex Schools CanBe an Option, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at Al (noting announcement by
Secretary of Education that Title IX regulations will be changed to allow schools more
leeway to engage in single-sex education). Of course, the propriety of a motivational inquiry
of an administrative agency is different than one seeking to discern a legislature's intent. But
both provide courts with difficult challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
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Michael M, may well defer to a possible legislative intent. Such
decisions, just like decisions upholding statutes under the rational basis
standard, should be seen as products of institutional competence
concerns, not statements of constitutional law. Given that conclusion,
and given Congress's particular institutional-based competence-in
this case, to discern the social meaning behind a legislative
classification-there is every reason to accord Congress significant
leeway under its Section 5 power to restrict or regulate what the court
had allowed.
The Court's analysis in Nevada DeparOnentofHuman Resources
243 the recent decision upholding the Family and Medical
v Hibbs,
Leave Act as a valid Section 5 enactment, highlights the value of this
approach to the Section 5 power. Hibbsupheld the statute as a valid
Section 5 enactment largely on the observation that the heightened
scrutiny accorded gender made it easier for Congress to show a pattern
of constitutional violations, to which the statute was a congruent and
proportional response.2" This approach, in which, like a see-saw, the
higher the judicial scrutiny a group receives, the easier it becomes for
Congress to justify a Section 5 statute aimed at that group, serves well
enough as a rough guidepost. But given the above explanation of the
Court's approach to gender, the Hibbs approach is surely overly
simplistic. Any concerns about congressional overreaching are better
accommodated by testing Section 5-based gender equality statutes
against a deeper understanding of the Court's own gender
jurisprudence, and against a more careful understanding of the extent
to which, in that particular context, Congress is institutionally betterplaced than the Court to give life to those judicially announced
principles.
B.

Race

In comparison to its rational basis, and even its gender
jurisprudence, the Court's race jurisprudence reflects a great deal of
confidence in its own ability to determine the reasonableness, and
hence the constitutionality, of government actions. 5 The Court's
409, 422 (1941) (noting the general disfavor with which courts view inquiries into the mental
processes of administrative decisionmakers).
243. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
244. See538 U.S. at 722.
245. See supm notes 56-66 and accompanying text. Even here, though, the Court has
recently approached classifications more circumspectly, recognizing, at the very least, other
entities' competence to reach conclusions on issues relevant to the equal protection analysis.
Most notably, in Grutter v Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003), the Court deferred to a
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embrace of strict scrutiny in Croson and Adatand was clearly
motivated by a conviction that government use of race is inherently
problematic, thus rendering strict scrutiny necessary in order to
confirm, to the Court's satisfaction, that use of race in that particular
case is legitimate." ' Again, it is worth noting that this suspicious
treatment of race is not driven in these cases by process concerns (as
indeed, it cannot be, given that these programs normally operate in
favor of groups that constitute numerical minorities)." 7 The strict
scrutiny in these cases, then, derives not from an intermediating
process concern, but rather from direct and fundamental judicial
suspicion of the reasonableness of race-conscious government action.
9 when combined,
Grutter v Bollinge48 and Gratz v Bollinger,4
reflect this judicial confidence. In the course of, respectively, upholding the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy and
striking down the University's undergraduate policy, the Court applied
its own vision of equal protection law, in particular, its insistence that
government consideration of race in the education context be
individualized rather than wholesale. Ironically, by upholding the law
school's program as sufficiently narrowly tailored, and thus proving
that strict scrutiny was not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact,, 25° Grutter
made clear that it would be the final judge of what strict scrutiny
required. In other words, in Grutterthe Court showed itself the master,
not the servant, of strict scrutiny. Indeed, the very fact that in the two
cases the strict scrutiny yielded different results strongly suggests that
university's statement of the benefits flowing from a diverse student body, which in turn
influenced the determination that the university had a compelling interest in such diversity.
246. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) ("The point of
carefully examining the interest asserted by the government in support of a racial
classification, and the evidence offered to show that the classification is needed, is precisely
to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking.");
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Absent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply
no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications
are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.
Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool.").
247. But see supm discussion and text accompanying note 64 (noting Croson's halfhearted attempt to explain how process theory justified strict scrutiny of the racial set-aside
enacted by Richmond, Virginia).
248. 539 U.S. at 343 (upholding the University of Michigan Law School's admissions
policies, despite their consideration of race).
249. 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan's
undergraduate college admissions policies, due to their inappropriate consideration of race).
250. Grutter,539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand,515 U.S. at 237).
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strict scrutiny is not simply a decisional aid, a sort of mirror image of
rational basis in which a court nearly automatically strikes down
government action just as rational basis normally results in an
upholding. Rather, the tone and results of these opinions indicate that
the Court was in fact making good on its own description of strict
scrutiny given in the contracting cases of a decade ago--namely, that
that standard is designed to allow the Court to reach an authoritative
conclusion about the constitutionality of the challenged government
action." '
In the case of race, then, the Court has stated "law" beyond the
fundamental requirement of reasonableness; namely, a suspicion that
race classifications are problematic and thus a requirement that, to be
constitutional, they must be carefully drawn.252 The support for such
suspicion is well known.
Most obviously, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Drafters were fundamentally concerned with the situation of African-Americans, especially newly freed slaves, a concern
that necessarily implied a larger concern with racial oppression.
Moreover, the republican character of the American system was
thought to be fundamentally incompatible with the notions of caste or
taint that characterized antebellum race relations in the United States.253
The Court's greater willingness to declare what equal protection
means in the race context necessarily suggests a somewhat more
limited role for congressional action predicated on Congress's own
understanding of what the antianimus rule requires. The Court has
clearly stated-for better or worse-its view of the social meaning of
race lines, and it has exhibited confidence in that view. The only other
potential justification for a congressional challenge, via a statute that,
for example, authorized states to engage in race-based affirmative
251. See cases cited supranote 246.
252. See Gmtz, 539 U.S. at 270 ("[R]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification... .")
(quotation omitted); id.at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing that "careful judicial
inspection" and "close review" of race classifications are necessary); Grutter,539 U.S. at 326
(describing race as a "highly suspect tool") (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality
opinion)); id at 343 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority's wish that
affirmative action might become unnecessary in the next twenty-five years); Adarmd, 515
U.S. at 228 (describing race classifications as "so seldom provid[ing] a relevant basis for
disparate treatment" (quotation omitted)). This is true regardless of the fact that disagreement
remains on the appropriate standard for reviewing affirmative action programs. See Grutter,
539 U.S. at 346 n.*) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (reserving the question whether affirmative
action programs should be reviewed with the same level of strictness as race classifications
that "burden a historically disadvantaged group"); Gmtz, 539 U.S. at 302 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that different levels of scrutiny may be appropriate).
253. SeeNELSON, supm note 191, at 13-39.
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action, would be Congress's superior ability to find empirical facts.
But against the conviction with which the Court believes in the
inappropriateness of government's use of race, a claim by Congress
simply to have found new empirical facts seems a weak justification
for congressional action inconsistent with the Court's own attitude.
Obviously, this analysis does not mean that Congress is disabled
from enacting Section 5 legislation with regard to race. Indeed, the
Court's own aversion to race classifications is intuitively consistent
with race-neutral antidiscrimination and equal opportunity legislation
enacted pursuant to Section 5. Thus, for example, the application of
federal employment race-discrimination laws to states would continue
to be an appropriate Section 5 enactment. Renewal of the Voting
Rights Act would also not contravene this analysis.25 ' Nor does this
analysis necessarily call into doubt race-conscious legislation, as long
as that legislation is consistent with judicially declared law. That law
allows some race-conscious government action, as both the Court's
rhetoric25 and results. 6 make clear. However, this analysis does
indicate that, in order to enact allegedly benign racial classifications,
Congress must tailor its actions carefully to the limits enunciated by
the Court. The determination of the exact dimensions of those limits
must await another occasion.
IV

SECTION

5 BEYOND EQUAL PROTECTION

This Article was motivated by recent trends in the Supreme
Court's constitutional law jurisprudence, most obviously, the new,
controversial judicial role in scrutinizing Section 5 enactments ushered
in by City of Boerne. But that controversy is exacerbated by the
unstable condition of the Court's underlying Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, against which Section 5 enactments are tested under
City of Boerne's congruence and proportionality standard. That
instability is most pronounced in the area of equal protection. As this
Article has argued, the inherently nonlegal nature of equal protection
254. Questions might arise about the congruence and proportionality of such
legislation to the underlying constitutional violations the statute seeks to correct. But those
questions speak more to the congruence and proportionality analysis itself, which is not the
focus of this Article.
255. See supm note 250 and accompanying text (noting that judicial statements
insisting that strict scrutiny for race classifications is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
256. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding a raceconscious law school admissions program to further the state's interest in a diverse student
body in an elite law school); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32
(1971) (upholding the use of race-conscious remedies to remedy school segregation).
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claims, plus the erosion, over the last twenty years, of the Court's
three-tiered scrutiny structure, suggest the appropriateness of a broader
Section 5 power, even within the framework of the judicial lawdeclaring supremacy announced in City ofBoerne.
But what of other areas of the Fourteenth Amendment? In at
least two recent cases, Lawrence v Texas 57 and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v Campbell,15 the Supreme Court has
struck down state laws as violations of substantive due process, even
though the rights thereby protected were either not denominated
fundamental or, in the case of punitive damages awards at issue in
State Farm, are notoriously difficult to extrapolate into a judicially
enforceable principle.25 In so doing, the Court has once again ventured
away from a mechanical application of its own doctrine, in this case,
the rule that infringements of less-than-fundamental rights get only the
most deferential scrutiny.6°
Significant differences remain between substantive due process
and equal protection, which may make this Article's Section 5 analysis
not easily transferable from one doctrine to another. The most notable
difference is the nature of the equal protection guarantee, which, as
argued earlier in this Article, is unique among Fourteenth Amendment
rights in its lack of a substantive legal core, and thus in its lack of
judicially accessible sources of meaning.261 Still, the Court's deviation
from "normal" substantive due process review in these cases provides
suggestive parallels to its more nuanced approach to equal protection
in cases over the last twenty years. In turn, the Court's intimations of
less rigid due process analysis justifies speculation whether this
Article's approach to Section 5, where what the Court does not say
about the underlying right is just as important as what it does say, may
be relevant to Fourteenth Amendment rights beyond equal protection.
If substantive due process doctrine is becoming just as contextualized
and amorphous as equal protection doctrine, then the Court can be
thought of as enunciating less and less constitutional law in that area as
257. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
258. 538 U.S. 408,417 (2003); see also BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
259. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state trial
procedure leaving to the jury the decision of whether to impose punitive damages and in what
amount, though still subject to review for "reasonableness' provides a defendant with
process which he is due).
260.

PlannedParenthoodv Casey,505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992), was also in this vein, as

in that case, the Court departed from its normal two-tiered level of scrutiny of substantive due
process in response to the uniquely compelling interests on both sides of the abortion
question.
261.

See supraPart I.A.
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well. In turn, the lack of firmly established law in this area means that
innovative Section 5 statutes are not as likely to outrun judicially
announced principles, in violation of the congruence and
proportionality standard. Thus, these developments in substantive due
process may well argue for increased latitude for congressional
legislation, as this Article has suggested is the case with equal
protection.

